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RULE 412 LAID BARE: A PROCEDURAL RULE THATCANNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT PLAINTIFFS FROM EMBARRASSING
EXPOSURE
Andrea A. Curcio*
I. INTRODUCTION
Women who have consensual sex with one man are not offended by
sexual overtures from other men.
Women precipitate harassment by the way they dress and talk.
Women who claim they are harassed are lying to get back at men
they dislike or to cover poor job performance.
Women who claim they are sexually harassed are just overreacting to
harmless jokes and flirtation.'
These are some of the myths2 and sexual stereotypes3 that have
shaped sexual harassment law and, consequently, the evidence
admissible in a sexual harassment case.
In sexual harassment cases, defendants have been permitted to
discover and introduce evidence of the plaintiffs sexual conduct outside
the workplace, the plaintiff's demeanor inside and outside the work-
place, and the plaintiff's sexual conduct with non-harassing coworkers.4
Although some judges have found this kind of evidence irrelevant,5
others have used it as justification to defeat the plaintiff's claim.6
I
* Associate Professor, Georgia State College of Law. J.D., University of North Carolina. My
thanks to: Julie Beberman, Marjorie Girth, Paul Milich, Mary Radford, and Natsu Saito for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Also, thanks to Lisa Smith-Butler, the law librarian who managed to track
down even the most obscure source. Finally, I appreciate the hard work and help of my research assistants:
Jessica Margolis, Megan Mathews, and Greg Willis.
1. For cases incorporating these views, see discussion infia Part II.B; see also infia notes 25-27.
2. SeeJudith Olans Brown et al., 77m Mythogenesis of Gnder: judicial Images of Women in Paid and Un-
paid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 457 (1996) (arguing that mythic generalizations of women permeate legal
doctrine); see a/soJane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment Equalit, Objectiki4y, and the Shaping of Legal
Standard, 43 EMORY LJ. 151, 153 (1994) (noting that "[s]exually harassing behavior is supported by
cultural myths and stereotypes derived from the norms and expectations about behaviors of men and
women").
3. See discussion inyra Part III.C (discussing sexual stereotypes in sexual harassment claims).
4. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing cases in which this type of discovery was permitted).
5. See, e-g., Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 932 (M.D. Ala. 1992)
(dismissing the defendant's argument that abuse by plaintiff's boyfriend was relevant to whether she
welcomed workplace verbal abuse and physical overtures); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983)
(finding that private consensual activities with one coworker, unknown to alleged harassers, do not waive
plaintiff's legal protections against sexual harassment).
6. See discussion intao Part II.B (discussing numerous district courts' use of a woman's sexual history
to defeat her sexual harassment claim).
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Judicial use of a woman's consensual sexual activities to defeat her
sexual harassment claim raised the ire of feminist scholars and activists.
Many argued that what was happening to sexual harassment victims was
akin to what had happened to rape victims before the enactment of the
rape shield laws-the accuser, rather than the accused, was put on trial.7
Congress attempted to solve this problem by amending Federal Rule
of Evidence 412, adding a civil equivalent to the criminal "rape shield"
statute.8 The articulated purpose of amending Rule 412 to include civil
claims was to protect a sexual harassment plaintiff from the "invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the
infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process."9  The
amended Rule 412 attempts to restrain judges' ability to admit evidence
of a sexual harassment plaintiffs sexual history and conduct. By limiting
the kind of evidence admissible in a sexual harassment trial, Congress
7. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L REv. 813, 827 (1991); Grace M. Dodier, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson: Sexual Harassment at Work, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 203, 221 (1987); Catherine
A. O'Neill, Sexual Harassment Case and he Law ofidme, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219,220 (1989).
8. Rule 412 covers both criminal and civil cases. The relevant portions of the amended Rule arc
quoted below. The portion relating to civil cases (the amended Rule referred to in this text) is italicized.
Rule 412. Sex Offense Cases: Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or
Alleged Sexual Predisposition
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any civil
or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in
subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, and
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible if otherwise admissible under
these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim cTered to prove
that a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the
person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the
prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a cil case, eviden offerd to prve t sexual beha or or sexual predisposition of any aed victim
s nissibe #it is oenoiue anmsi le under thee nd and its probative aWlubsanta ouihs the
danerof ham oany iminiand of wfaipjdia o-ay pa-V Evidenceof an allged vitims repsation
isamiseoif ithasrbeen placed incontrowrq by t&i alleged victim ...
FED. R. EVID. 412 (emphasis added).
Subsection (c) of the Rule deals with the procedures to determine admissibility of evidence permitted
under subsection (b). See id
9. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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hoped to protect sexual harassment plaintiffs' privacy, 0 and thus
encourage suits aimed at redressing injuries caused by workplace sexual
harassment."
This article reviews how the substantive sexual harassment law led
many judges to condone a full exploration of a sexual harassment
plaintiff's consensual sexual activities which led Congress to enact the
amendments to Rule 412. The article then explores the application of
amended Rule 412 and concludes that it has not achieved fully its stated
purpose for at least three reasons: (1) some courts have been reluctant
or unwilling to apply the evidentiary rule to civil discovery; (2) the
Rule's 'privacy" protections have been skirted by other procedural rules
such as the rules governing expert witnesses and psychological examina-
tions; and (3) the Rule has been applied by judges affected by gender-
biased attitudes. 2 The article then offers potential solutions to these
problems, such as changes to Rule 412, changes to the discovery rules,
and educative efforts aimed at heightening awareness of gender-biased
attitudes and sexual stereotypes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Histogy of the Development of Ttle VII Sexual Harassment Claims
Sexual misconduct may give rise to various civil claims; however,
it was the type of evidence being admitted in Tide VII claims for sexual
harassment that provided the impetus for Congress to amend Rule 412
to include civil claims.'4 To understand the amended Rule and its
10. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Sept. 1993, § iv.
11. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
12. This article focuses on women plaintiffs because, as Professor Radford notes, the majority of
sexual harassment plaintiffs are women who allege they have been harassed by men. See Mary F. Radford,
By Invitation Ony: Te Proof of Wekonseness in Sixual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L REV. 499, 521 (1991).
However, it is important to realize that men may be subjected to workplace sexual harassment as well, see,
e.g., Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991) (examining Tide VII claim
for sexual harassment brought by male employees), and that same sex harassment may also occur, see, e.g.,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 118 S. CL 998, 1002 (1998). Many of the issues discussed herein
apply to claims brought by men and to same-sex sexual harassment claims.
13. For example, a plaintiff may have a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987), civil assault and battery, see Alberts v. Wickes
Lumber Co., 1995 WL 117886 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995), or negligent transmission of a sexual disease, see
Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339 (11 th Cir. 1997).
14. Paul Nicholas Monnin, Provi Weniess: The Admissihly of Elidm of Sexual History in Sexual
Harassment Claims Under the 1994Anendntt to Federal Rule ofEvidence 412,48 VAND. L. REv. 1155, 1169
(1995).
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successes and failures, it is important to understand the history of Title
VII sexual harassment claims.
Some scholars have noted that when Title VII was enacted in 1964,
the insertion of "sex" discrimination was a last-minute addition
introduced to "highlight the absurdity" of the legislation and to defeat
it.15 Others contend that its insertion was the result of "complex
political struggles involving racial issues, presidential politics, and
competing factions of the women's rights movement." 6
Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the term "sex" into the Act,
initially courts rejected Title VII sexual harassment claims because
courts believed that sexual harassment did not qualify as "discrimination
on the basis of one's sex."' 7 Even after courts decided that sexual
harassment might constitute such discrimination, many early Title VII
sexual harassment claims were still dismissed because some courts
believed that women who suffered from unwanted sexual attention had
somehow encouraged that attention. Thus, they were victims of
"interpersonal difficulties" of their own making, rather than victims of
sex discrimination. 8
Courts also articulated other themes when denying these claims.
Some courts feared that allowing Title VII sexual harassment claims
would mean that all sexually oriented advances would become
actionable and that it would be impossible to distinguish harmless
flirtation from illegal harassment." Courts also worried that allowing
a legal remedy would "open the floodgates."2
By the late 1970s, courts began to recognize that tying job benefits or
detriments, or ajob itself, to a woman's compliance with an employer's
sexual demands violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion.2 This form of sexual harassment is known as "quid pro quo"
sexual harassment.22
15. Estrich, supra note 7, at 816-817.
16. Robert C. Bird, More Than A Congressional jok" A Fresh Look at ze Legislativs Histoy of Sex
Discnmination ofthe 1964 CivilRights Act, 3 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L 137, 138 (1997).
17. For a discussion of decisions articulating this position, see Michael D. Vhay, The Hans ofAskng:
TowardsA Comprehensive Treatment ofq e.xualHarassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 329-33 (1988).
18. For a survey of cases positing this view, see Joan S. Weiner, Comment, Understanding Unwekome-
nessin&wualHasnmentLaw: ItsHistoandaProposalforRefown, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 622 (1997);
Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The "Unwelcome" Requireaent In Sexual Harasment Cases, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1563 (1992).
19. For a discussion of these decisions, see Vhay, supra note 17, at 331-32.
20. Id
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Garber v. Saxon Bus.
Prod., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
22. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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A few years later, courts found that a cognizable sexual harassment
Title VII claim may exist when an employer creates or condones a
substantially discriminatory work atmosphere regardless of whether the
complaining employee lost any tangible job benefits as a result of the
discrimination.23 This claim has come to be known as a "hostile work
environment" claim.24 Although courts became more willing to use
Title VII to create a remedy for women subjected to a hostile work
environment, the judges developing the law still feared that some
women might use these claims to retaliate against an ex-lover,25 to hide
poor job performance, 26 or simply because they misunderstood
"normal" workplace flirtations. 27
The tension between a desire to provide a remedy and a desire to
protect employers from spurious claims is evident in the elements of a
hostile work environment claim: (1) the employee belongs to a
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; and
23. See Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
( lIth Cir. 1982).
24. Catherine MacKinnon's ground-breaking work, SEXUALHARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979), helped courts to understand the inequitable work place power
structures, and why, given the social realities, they needed a legal remedy for both "quid pro quo" and
"hostile work environment" claims. See Holly B. Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception ofLa Reform.
Sexual Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH.J.L REF. 475, 485 (1990).
Recently the Supreme Court noted that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work
environment cases serves to "instruct that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations
in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the latter must be severe or persuasive."
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
25. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.NJ. 1976) ("An
invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship
tum[s] sour at some later time."). This attitude continues to influence some judicial decision making. See,
e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiff's claim invalid
because it was really a simple case of"a workplace romance gone awry"); Rothenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing plaintiff's claim as a "classic story of workplace romance turned
sour").
26. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987) (ordering remand when the trial
court concluded plaintiffwas dismissed for poorjob performance and refused to consider her hostile work
environment claim despite fact that court found that plaintiff's supervisor touched her buttocks and breasts
and that these touchings were neither invited nor encouraged); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d
1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 1994) (overturning the district court's finding that the plaintiff's poor attendance
record and its impact on "shop morale," rather than the sexually harassing conduct of her coworkers is
what made the workplace atmosphere "unbearable" for the plaintiff).
27. See, e.g., Tomkim, 422 F. Supp. at 557 (arguing that men and women are naturally attracted to
each other); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that because sexual attraction
often plays a role in daily workers' social interactions, "the distinction between invited, uninvited-but-
welcome, offensive-but-tolerated and flatly rejected" sexual advances may be hard to determine); Lipsett
v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881,898 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that a "determination ofsexual harassment
turns on whether it is found that the plaintiff misconstrued or overreacted to what the defendant claims
were innocent or invited overtures").
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(4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition or privilege
of employment.28 These elements dictated the parameters of admissible
evidence.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for imposition of
employer liability in sexual harassment claims.29 It held that once a
factfinder determines an employee has been a victim of workplace
sexual harassment created by a supervisor, the employer is liable if the
plaintiff suffered a "tangible employment action."3 If the victimized
employee did not suffer a tangible employment action, the employer
may raise an affirmative defense to respondeat superior liability or to
damages.3  The defense has two elements (1) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior; and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to "avoid the harm otherwise."32 How
these decisions will affect the kind of evidence admissible in sexual
harassment claims is yet to be seen. However, it is not inconceivable
that defendants will try and argue that the same kind of evidence that
they have contended is relevant to prove that the conduct at issue was
not unwelcome is also relevant to prove that the plaintiff failed to avoid
the harm otherwise.33
B. How the Substantive Law Led Courts to Admit Evidence of Sexual Histot
,
Unlike in other employment discrimination claims,34 in a sexual
harassment claim, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's conduct was
unwelcome in that she did not solicit or incite such conduct35 and that
28. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982).
29. SeeFaragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington, 118 S. Ct. 2257.
30. Faraghe, 118 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
31. See id. at 2279.
32. Id.
33. For example, defendants have argued that a plaintiff's way of dressing or speaking indicated that
she welcomed the harassing conduct. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison, 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguing that
the plaintiffs failure to wear a bra and her verbal sparring with coworkers indicated "welcomeness").
Employers, citing Faragher, may now argue that the same evidence is relevant to show that the plaintiff, by
failing to change her manner of dress or language once she was being harassed, "failed to avoid the harm
otherwise." For a discussion of why this argument may be based upon sexual stereotypical views and, if so,
why it should not be admissible, see discussion infta Part III.C.3 (discussing how sexual stereotypes influence
evidentiary decisions in sexual harassment claims).
34. As some scholars have noted, sexual harassment is the only Title VII claim which requires the
plaintiff to prove "unwelcomeness." See Vhay, supra note 17, at 344; Estrich, supra note 7, at 826.34.
35. Some courts have stated that the test is whether the plaintiff solicited or invited (not incited) the
conduct. See Radford, supra note 12, at 514.
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she found the conduct undesirable. 6 The "unwelcomeness" or "wel-
comeness" element has led some courts to allow defendants to discover
and introduce evidence of a plaintiff's appearance, dress, and sexual
activities unrelated to interactions with the alleged harasserS--a trend
that was reinforced by the dicta in Meritor v. Vinson. 8
In Meritor, the Supreme Court formally recognized that sexual
harassment claims, including hostile work environment claims, are
cognizable under Title VII. However, in dicta, 9 the Court rejected the
appellate court's finding that a woman's speech, dress, and fantasies are
presumptively irrelevant in determining whether the plaintiff welcomed,
that is, solicited or incited, the alleged harassing conduct. Writing for
the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that:
While voluntariness in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a
claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative
speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether
he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the
contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC guidelines
emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual
harassment in light of the "record as a whole" and the "totality of
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred."'
The Supreme Court found that balancing the probative value against
the possibility of unfair prejudice of evidence of speech, dress, and other
36. See Henson v. City of Dundee 682 F.2d 897,903 (1 th Cir. 1982); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty,
Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783-84 (IstCir. 1990). Thejustification for placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove
the conduct was unwelcome, was to ensure that "sexual harassment charges do not become a tool by which
one party to a consensual sexual relationship may punish the other." Vhay, supra note 17, at 344 (discussing
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Brief in Mitor).
37. See, e.g., Neely v. American Fidelity Ins. Co., No. 77-015 I-B, 1978 WL 65, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 21, 1978) (admitting evidence that plaintiff had been an amateur go-go dancer); Wimberly v. Shoney's
Inc., No. CV584-098, 1985 WL 5410, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1985) (admitting evidence that plaintiff had
given birth to an illegitimate child); Collins v. Pfizer, Inc., No. H 82-1007, 1985 WL 56689, at *2 (D.
Conn.July 5, 1985) (characterizing the plaintiffas an "attractive buxom" woman). In Vinson v. Taylor,
753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the appellate court observed that the district court's finding that
the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the conduct may have been based in part upon the voluminous
testimony about the plaintiffls dress and personal fantasies but held that consideration of these factors was
improper. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court ofappeals's assessment of the irrelevance of this
evidence. See Mertor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
38. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
39. The issue in Mentor was not the relevancy of the evidence about the plaintiff's lifestyle, rather,
the issue before the court was whether a woman had a cognizable claim for workplace sexual harassment
under Title VII.
40. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
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conduct was a question properly addressed at the district court's
discretion.4
Meitor did not mandate the admission of evidence of a plaintiff's
sexual history, conduct, speech, or mannerisms. 42  However, many
courts have used the Supreme Court's totality of the circumstances dicta
as justification for delving into aspects of a plaintiffs life unrelated to her
interactions with her alleged harasser. In fact, in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
relying on Meitor, noted that to properly assess whether a plaintiff
proved a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, a court
should consider, among other things, the background and experience of
the plaintiff.43
Another factor that influenced the courts in considering a sexual
harassment plaintiff's dress, speech, and lifestyle relevant was that to
prevail in a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must prove
both that a reasonable person, or reasonable woman,' would have
found the workplace environment hostile and that the plaintiff in fact
41. See id.
42. The Court's directive to consider evidence of speech, dress, and other conduct as it applies to
the "totality of the circumstances" could have been interpreted as allowing this evidence only in response
to a defendant's actions or when the plaintiff's conduct was directed specifically at the defendant. However,
courts refused to define "totality of the circumstances" so narrowly. Some courts considered all plaintiff's
conduct, inside and outside of the workplace, to be part of the test. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Wesco Inv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1156 n.5 (8th Cir. 1988). Others
considered only conduct known to the alleged harasser. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.
1987); Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
43. &e Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. See also, Jacqueline H. Sloan, E&tendig Rape Shield Protection to Sexual
Harassment Aaions: .Nw Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. U.
L. REv. 363, 384-86 (1996). Sloan notes that courts took three different approaches to Metor's language
on considering the plaintiff's dress and lifestyle. See i Some courts interpreted this to mean that the
evidence was automatically admissible; others held it was relevant but only if the defendant was aware of
the conduct; and, finally, some courts were much more restrictive and examined the evidence closely to
see how it related to the plaintiff's complaints about her working environment. See id.
44. The circuit courts vary in the tests that they apply. Some circuits apply a reasonable woman,
rather than a reasonable person test. Compare Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11 th Cir. 1997)
("reasonable person" test); Reed v. Lawrence, 95 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1996) ("reasonable person" test);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) ("reasonable person" test); De
Angelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995) ("reasonable person" test);
Berman v. Washington Times Corp., Civ. A. No. 92-2738, 1994 WL 750274 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1994)
("reasonable person" test); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990)
("reasonable person" test); Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990) ("reasonable woman"
test); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989), sunprseded on othergrounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.
1990) ("reasonable person" test); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) ("reasonable
person" test) ith Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) ("reasonable woman" test);
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) ("reasonable woman" test); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1987) ("reasonable woman" test). See also King v. Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(sexual harassment claims should be evaluated from the perspective of the one being harassed).
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found it hostile.45 This element served as a gateway for the admission
of plaintiffs' sexual conduct and private lives.
Evidence of a plaintiffs sexual history and sexual conduct inside and
outside the workplace has been introduced at sexual harassment trials
to prove that the plaintiff was not the kind of person who would have
found the workplace environment hostile. For example, in Burns v.
MacGregor,46 the trial judge permitted the defendant to introduce
evidence that the plaintiff posed nude for a motorcycle magazine, that
her father pierced her nipples, and that her brother observed the nude
picture taking. These facts led the judge to conclude that the plaintiff
was not the kind of person who would be offended by unwelcome work-
place advances.47 In Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,48 a hostile
work environment case, the defendant hosted sales parties where men
brought in "road whores" who were "berated, talked down to, made fun
of and passed around."49 Plaintiff testified that these parties made her
feel 'less than human' and 'dirty, like there's something wrong with
being a woman.""'5  Because the plaintiff admitted to having had an
affair with a married man, the district court found that she could not
have found the conduct at the sales parties offensive.5' In Blankenship v.
Parke Care Centers, Inc.,52 plaintiffs complained that a coworker engaged
in uninvited hugging and kissing, declarations of love, blowing kisses and
licking his lips, making obscene gestures toward his crotch, making
vulgar sexual remarks, repeatedly asking for dates, and approaching one
plaintiff from behind and lifting her breasts with his hands.5" In
Blankenship, the court not only considered evidence of the plaintiffs'
childhood sexual abuse relevant, but used this evidence as one reason to
defeat the plaintiffs' claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs'
45. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
46. 807 F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D. Iowa 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
47. The district court decision was overturned on appeal. See Bumsf, 989 F.2d at 963. The appellate
court noted:
[P]laintifl's choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work hours is not material to the
issue of whether plaintiff found her employer's work-related conduct offensive .... Her
private life, regardless how reprehensible the trier of fact might find it to be, did not provide
lawful acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her work place by her employer.
Id.
48. 27 F.3d 1316 (8th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 1320.
50. Id
51. Id. at 1322. The appellate court disagreed, noting that a "person's private and consensual
sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her legal protections against unwelcome and unsolicited
sexual harassment." Id. at 1327 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)).
52. 913 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
53. Seeid at 1053-54.
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histories may have made them peculiarly susceptible to the coworker's
harassment.5
4
Plaintiffs' "sexual history" has also been permitted as evidence for a
myriad of other reasons. During discovery in a sexual harassment case
in which the plaintiff alleged her supervisor raped her several times at
a hotel where they both worked, the plaintiff was asked if she had ever
watched X-rated films with her husband.55 Defense counsel argued that
the purpose of the question was to suggest that the plaintiff had
concocted her allegations from movies she might have seen.56 Other
witnesses were asked if the plaintiff had slept with her husband before
marriage and if she had dated other men.57 The defense attorney
argued that the questions about premarital dating were intended to
show that the plaintiff's husband was not a jealous man and that the
plaintiff, if raped, could have confided in him.58
In a sexual discrimination case in New Mexico,59 defense lawyers
obtained a plaintiff's gynecology records from her college days at the
University of California at Berkeley, asked the plaintiffs ex-boyfriend
how often the couple had sex, and asked the plaintiffs therapists about
the plaintiff's early sexual experiences, sex practices and relationships,
and whether the plaintiff was promiscuous. They also inquired whether
the plaintiff hated men because her former marriage was acrimonious
54. See id. at 1055 n.3.
55. See Ellen E. Schultz & Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ply: Plainiffis' Se Lives Are Being Lad Bare In
Harassment Cases, WALLST.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at Al (discussing the trial of RosemaryJ. Martin in Norfolk,
va.).
56. See iL; see adso Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994). In
/N!-eZuian, the plaintiffalleged that for three years, the defendant verbally and physically sexually harassed
her by approaching her from behind and putting his hands on her breasts, pinching her buttocks, grabbing
her crotch, and asking if she was wet. See id at 460. The defendant also asked about her lingerie, her
"pussy," ifshe "took it in the ass," and if she "swallowed." See id The defendant claimed that he and the
plaintiffhad a consensual relationship and that he ended it when the plaintiff told him she was pregnant.
See id. at 460 n. I. The trial court precluded defendant's'attempt to use information about the plaintiff's
viewing of adult videos with her husband, her abortions, her prior sexual history, and sexual conduct with
individuals other than the defendant or other coworkers by granting plaintiff's motion in limine. See id at
463.
57. See Schultz & Woo, supra note 55, atAl.
58. See Schultz & Woo, upra note 55; see also Sensibello v. Globe Sec. Sys., Inc., No. 814052, 1984
WL 1118 (D.C. Pa. Jan. 10, 1984). In Sensibelo, the plaintiff was bluntly propositioned by numerous
company executives. See id. at *2. One executive physically assaulted her, attempting to rip off her
clothing. See id at *3. The court considered the fact that the plaintiff was living with her immediate boss
and noted that some of the more overt instances ofsexual advances and propositions "were attributable to
the arguably reasonable but, as it turns out, incorrect assumption that plaintiff was not averse to employing
unconventional means of advancing her career." At at *8. Despite its view that plaintiff's sexual
relationship was relevant, the court still found plaintiff had a meritorious sexual harassment claim. Id
59. See Schultz & Woo, xupra note 55.
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and whether she had a "victim mentality" because she was raped as a
teenager.6 °
As sexual harassment law developed, a few courts stringently
examined the relevance of evidence of a plaintiffs sexual history and
some actually barred discovery.6' Those prohibiting discovery reasoned
that evidence of a plaintiff's sexual activities with individuals other than
the alleged harasser had no bearing on whether the plaintiff welcomed
workplace overtures and merely served to embarrass and annoy the
plaintiff.62 Additionally, some courts reasoned that permitting this kind
of discovery had the potential to discourage sexual harassment litigants
from prosecuting their claims, thus defeating the remedial effect
intended by Congress when it enacted Title VI".6
Although a few courts would not permit discovery of the intimate
details of a plaintiffs private sexual life, many lower courts not only
allowed discovery of details of plaintiffs' private lives, they admitted this
evidence and then used it to defeat the plaintiffs' claims.64 Despite the
fact that many of these decisions were overturned on appeal because of
the erroneous consideration of this evidence,6 5 many scholars criticized
the district court decisions allowing defendants to use evidence of
plaintiffs' lifestyles to defeat their workplace sexual harassment claims.66
Legal scholars argued that in deciding what evidence was relevant,
judges confused sexual harassment with voluntary sexual activity and
failed to understand that workplace sexual harassment is about power,
not about sex.6 They noted that this misconception was reminiscent of
a similar misconception in rape cases.68
60. See it
61. &e Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal 1983); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481
(D. Utah 1987); Longmire v. Alabama State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
62. Seegeneraly Friest, 98 F.R.D. 755; see aLro Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. 481.
63. SeNer4t, 98 F.R.D. at 761.
64. S*, e.g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 913 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Stacks
v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, 27 F.3d 1316, 1322 (8th Cir. 1994); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus.,
807 F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D. Iowa 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
65. For example, appellate courts reversed decisions of trial courts in Bums, see Bums, 989 F.2d at
660, and Stak-, see Stacks, 27 F.3d at 1327. In fact, Buns was reversed, remanded, and then, reversed again.
989 F.2d at 961. The second time Burns was in the appellate court, the appellate court entered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and simply remanded the case for a finding of damages See id at 966.
66. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 7, at 828-31; Monnin, supra note 14, at 1187-93; Juliano, supra note
18, at 1583-86.
67. SeegeneraMy Estrich, supra note 7, at 820; Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Seuality Under the
Law, i00 YALE I.J. 1281 (1991); Susan M. Mathews, 7ak VHandSSnat/Hawssne"n Beyond Dwnages Control,
3 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 299, 308 (1991). But see Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambiaence and Stereoype
Cause Sexual Harasment A 7heoy ith Implicationsfor Organizationad Change, 51 J. Soc. IssuEs 97, 99 (1995)
(noting that sometimes sexual harassment can be motivated by a man's desire to seek intimacy).
68. &e Estrich, supra note 7, at 827; see also Fechner, supra note 24, at 493.
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Some argued that, just as in rape cases, in many sexual harassment
cases, the victim, rather than the alleged aggressor, was being put on
trial.69 Also, as in the earlier rape trials, evidence of a woman's sexual
history or relationships, or evidence of her use of vulgar language and
crude jokes, was misused, as this evidence encouraged the fact finder to
infer that the victim was "unchaste and immoral ... and... undeserv-
ing of protection. 70  Some noted that the defendant's conduct often was
excused by the court's refusal to punish the defendant, and that some
courts, in essence, reprimanded the woman for failing to conform to the
societal norms of how a "lady" should act.7 Finally, some argued that
admitting such evidence to show the plaintiff was not credible, or that
the plaintiff likely welcomed the conduct, "reinforce [d] sexist attitudes
and preclude[d] the educative function of the law. 72
Women's advocates also noted that, as in rape cases, a woman's fear
of having her sex life publicly exposed was a strong disincentive to filing
suit for sexual harassment.7 In fact, in one survey, ninety percent of
sexual harassment victims reported that they were unwilling to come
forward for two primary reasons: fear of retaliation and fear of loss of
privacy.7"
Congress ameliorated some of the problems arising from the misuse
of a woman's sexual history in criminal rape trials by enacting Rule 412,
the federal rape shield law.75 Thus, it is not surprising that when the
problems discussed above were brought to Congress' attention,
Congress attempted to remedy them in the same way-by extending
Rule 412 to include civil, as well as criminal cases.
69. See Estrich, supra note 7, at 827; O'Neill, supra note 7, at 244; Donna L. Laddy, Comment,
Bums v. McGregor Electronic Industries: A Per Se Rule Against Admitting Evidence of General Sexual Expression
as a Defense to Sexual Harassment Claims, 78 IOWA L. REV. 939, 957 (1993).
70. Monnin, supra note 14, at 1187.
71. See Laddy, supra note 69, at 951 n.93. For example, in Burns v. McGregor Electric Industries,
955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992), the district court found the defendant's conduct was unwelcome, but found
no liability because the plaintiff, who had posed nude for a magazine and had pierced nipples and a tattoo,
was not the type ofperson who would be offended by the defendant's physical overtures and crude remarks.
Cf Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture ofAcceptance, 43 FLA. L. REv. 487,490 (199 1) (discussing a
Florida rape case in which the jury found the defendant not guilty because, by wearing a short see-through
skirt, the victim "asked for it").
72. O'Neill, supra note 7, at 3.
73. For a discussion of how these rulings discouraged women from filing civil suits, see Estrich, supra
note 7, at 833-34; O'Neill, supra note 7, at 8.
74. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT: RESEARCH AND RESOURCES: A REPORT PREPARED BY THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, (citing a study by Klein Associates, Inc., The 1988
Working Women Sexual Harassment Survey Executive Report).
75. But see Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidmce: Msculim Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 127, 134 (1996) (arguing that rape shield reforms have been unsuccessful in achieving their
aims).
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C. The Enactment ofAmended Rule 412
After extensive public hearings and discussion,76 the Rules Advisory
Committee promulgated an amended version of Rule 412 which
applied the Rule to civil cases.77 The amended Rule placed the burden
on the proponent of sexual history evidence to show why the evidence's
relevance outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.78 Pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act (REA), the Advisory Committee forwarded the
amended Rule to the Supreme Court for adoption and transmittal to
Congress. 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the Court's concern that the
proposed amendment might "encroach on the rights of defendants,"8 °
noting that in Meitor, the Court remarked that evidence of an alleged
victim's "sexually provocative speech or dress" may be relevant in
workplace harassment cases. The Supreme Court refused to forward
the proposed rule to Congress because some Justices believed that the
proposed Rule's limitations on the defendant's ability to use a plaintiffs
sexual history evidence might so severely hamper a defendant's ability
to present a defense that it would abridge a defendant's substantive
rights, thus violating the REA."l
76. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of May 6-7, 1993
(detailing comments by Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
The Women's Legal Defense Fund, The American College of Trial Lawyers, NOW Legal Defense &
Education Fund). For an extensive discussion of the procedural history of amended Rule 412, see Monnin,
supra note 14, at 1169-74.
77. As Professor Eileen A. Scallen explains, the normal procedure is for the Advisory Committee
to prepare a draft rule or proposed change to a rule. This proposed rule then goes to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure which either accepts, rejects, or modifies the proposed rule.
If the Standing committee accepts the draft, it forwards the rule and the Advisory Committee Notes to the
Judicial Conference which, in turn, transmits its recommendations to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court reviews the rule changes, modifies them if it wishes and then sends them to Congress through
an Order of the Court. Congress then has a specific period of time in which it may modify or reject the
rules. If it fails to act on the rules, they go into effect as transmitted by the Court. See Eileen A. Scallen,
Interpreting the Federal Rules of E"ideccL The Use and Abuse ofthe Advisoy Committee Vottes, 28 LOY. L.A. L REV.
1283, 1288-89 (1995).
78. See supra note 8 for the text of amended Rule 412.
79. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Sept. 1993 [hereinafter REPORT].
80. Letter from William Rehnquist, ChiefJustice of the United States Supreme Court, toJohn F.
Gerry, Chair, Executive Committee,Judicial Conference of the United States (Apr. 29, 1994) (on file with
author).
81. The Supreme Court is authorized to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules
of evidence for cases in the United States District Courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). However, such rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." Id.
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Congress solved the R.EA dilemma by disregarding the Court's
concerns and enacting the amended Rule, along with the Advisory
Committee Notes, without the Supreme Court's blessing.82 The Rule
and Advisory Committee Notes were incorporated into the Violent
Crime Control Act of 1994.83
Under the amended Rule, evidence of an alleged victim's sexual
behavior or alleged sexual predisposition, whether offered as substantive
evidence or for impeachment, is not "obviously relevant."84 In fact, the
opposite is true. This evidence now is inadmissible unless its probative
value substantially outweighs the danger of prejudice to any party and
harm to the victim.85
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that Congress intended Rule
412 to have a broad scope. According to the Advisory Committee
Notes, the term "sexual behavior" "encompass[es] all activities involving
or implying sexual intercourse or sexual contact, as well as activities of
the mind, such as fantasies or dreams."8 6 The Advisory Committee
explained that the term "sexual predisposition" includes all "evidence
that does not direcdy refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that may
have a sexual connotation for the fact finder, such as evidence relating
to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech or lifestyle." 87
As the legislative history indicates, the revised Rule was enacted in an
effort to "be fair to the victim and not focus on her past sexual behav-
ior."88 The Rule is intended to "expand the protection afforded alleged
82. Although Congress often accepts the Rules as promulgated by the Supreme Court, enacting
rules different from those accepted by the Supreme Court is not without precedent. When the original
Federal Rules of Evidence were proposed, Congress "held hearings and prepared committee reports,
scrutinized the Rules, changed them substantially, and finally enacted the changed version in statutory
form." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.2 (1995).
83. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat. 1796, 1919) § 40141.
84. This is the dicta in Merilor that many courts relied upon in making evidentiary determinations.
See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
85. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). Prior to the enactment of Rule 412, the evidence was presumptively
admissible unless the plaintiff proved that the evidence's probative value was outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice. Under Rule 412, the evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless the defendant shows
that the evidence's probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair
prejudice to any party. See Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996) (noting Rule
412 makes the evidence presumptively inadmissible).
86. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. Members of the Supreme Court disagree on the
weight to be accorded to the Advisory Committee notes. See Scallen, supra note 77, at 1284-94 (noting that
Justice Kennedy views the notes as an authoritative source that should be given great weight in interpreting
the rules while Justice Scalia believes that although the advisory committee notes may be persuasive, they
are not authoritative).
87. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
88. 140 CONG. REc. H8968-01, H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
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victims of sexual misconduct."89 It is aimed at safeguarding the alleged
victim against the "invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and
sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact finding
process,"9 thereby affording the protection necessary "to encourage
victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal
proceedings against alleged offenders."
91
In choosing between the competing concerns of protecting a sexual
harassment plaintiffs privacy and protecting an alleged harasser, or
harasser's employer,92 against the possibility of an unjust verdict,
Congress tipped the balance in favor of protecting the plaintiff.
However, it did not tip the balance very far. Application of Rule 412
leaves to the district courts the difficult task of balancing a plaintiff's
privacy interests against a defendant's right to prove the plaintiff was not
offended or that the plaintiff welcomed the alleged harasser's overtures.
The attempt to balance these interests has led to a wide range of
decisions. These decisions demonstrate that Rule 412, by itself, has not
adequately protected sexual harassment plaintiffs. The next section of
the article discusses why the Rule has failed to protect plaintiffs as
Congress intended. It suggests there are three main reasons: (1)
problems applying Rule 412 to discovery in sexual harassment cases; (2)
difficulty reconciling the Rule with other evidentiary rules such as expert
opinion rules; and (3) the interplay of the Rule's discretionary nature
with the potential impact of gender bias and subconscious judicial
ambivalence towards sexual harassment claims.
III. WHY RuLE 412 CANNOT ACHIEVE ITS STATED GOALS
A. Problems Appling Rule 412 to Discovery Issues
1. Differing Goals of Evidentiary and Discovery Rules
One of the main reasons Rule 412 cannot adequately protect sexual
harassment plaintiffs' privacy is that it is a rule of evidence, not of
discovery. In most criminal rape trials there is little formal pre-trial
89. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See spra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing employer liability in sexual harassment
claims).
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discovery from the victim."H An evidentiary rule adequately protects an
alleged rape victim's privacy because the trial is the first time she may
be questioned by opposing counsel about intimate details of her private
life. 4 This is not true in civil cases. It is during the discovery process in
civil cases that the plaintiffs private life becomes the focus of the
defendant's inquiry.
Defense attorneys use pre-trial discovery to explore the plaintiff's
sexual history, relationships, and any incidents of sexual abuse or violent
sexual encounters.95 Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that these tactics are
designed to pressure plaintiffs to drop cases or to settle for unfairly low
amounts.9 Defense attorneys claim that these are legitimate inquiries
which are relevant to liability and damages. 7 Both parties are aware
that because discovery rulings are not immediately appealable, the
93. Only a few states allow a criminal defendant to depose material witnesses as of right. See FLA.
R. GRIM. P. 3.220(b)(l)(A), 3.220(h)(1); N.D. R. GRIM. P. 15(a); VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). In a minority of
states, the defendant may seek a court ordered deposition of a material witness if the witness refuses to
consent to an interview and if the witness was not questioned at a preliminary hearing. See, e.g., ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2) (giving the court discretion to order the examination of a material witness if the person
was not a witness at the preliminary hearing and the person will not cooperate in granting a personal
interview); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1994); IOWA R. GRIM. P. 12(1) (allowing depositions in
criminal cases, but permitting the state to object if the witness is a foundation witness or has been
adequately examined at the preliminary hearing); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201(l)(c) (1993) (allowing
a deposition if the prospective material witness is unwilling to provide relevant information to the requesting
party); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (allowing a deposition in the court's discretion);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §. 517-13(11) (Supp. 1993) (giving the court the discretion to order a deposition);
N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-503(A) (permitting compelled witness statements from uncooperative
witnesses); TEX. GRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 39.02 (West 1997) (allowing deposition upon petition stating
facts necessary to constitute good cause to depose); WASH. ST. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6(a) (allowing
defendant to depose a material witness who refuses to discuss the case with defense counsel). For a
discussion about the lack of formal pre-trial discovery devices in criminal cases, see Jean Montoya, A Theo0,
of Compulory Process Clause Discovery Rg/s, 70 IND. LJ. 845 (1995).
94. Prior to the enactment of the rape shield statute, defendants elicited evidence of a complainant's
prior non-marital or extramarital sexual activity by cross examining the complainant, calling one or more
men to testify about their prior sexual relations with her, or by calling witnesses to testify about the
complainant's reputation of chastity or promiscuity. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the
ConstitutioL. Evidence Relating /a a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sevual Behaio, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 709, 714
(1995).
95. See supra Part II.B (discussing the types of information sought during discovery in sexual
harassment claims).
96. See Schultz & Woo, supra note 55; Jane Daugherty, Sesual Harassment Takes Devastating Toll,
DETROIT NEWS,Jan. 28, 1997, at DI (quoting a plaintiff's attorney who stated, "some defense attorneys
go into the workplace with an industrial strength vacuum and suck up every piece of dirt, innuendo and
rumor. Then they throw all this at the victim, hoping some of it will stick in the minds of the jury or break
the victim down.").
97. See Ann Davis, Ruling May Halt Defense Strategy of Using Plaintiffs' Pasts in Suit, WALL ST.J., Dec.
29, 1997, at B5 (quoting a defense attorney who notes that when a plaintiff is seeking damages for
emotional distress, the lawyer makes inquiries about the plaintiff's entire life because, "in fairness, the
company has the right to see what else has happened in [her] life").
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district court's decision is crucial.9" If the district court permits extensive
discovery despite a plaintiffs objection, the plaintiff has no recourse
other than to comply with the discovery request, to dismiss her claim, or
to settle her claim, perhaps for much less than its true value. On the
other hand, if the court fails to allow discovery, it may unfairly hamper
a defendant's ability to defend against spurious claims.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412 advise courts to make
discovery orders with Rule 412 in mind and to seal the file when
appropriate.99 However, this admonition provides courts with little
guidance and trial courts are struggling with what role, if any, Rule 412
plays in discovery issues.
One significant problem for courts involves reconciling the two
different purposes served by evidence and discovery rules. The Rules of
Evidence "attempt to manage the various risks and opportunities that
the trial process presents in an adversary setting."' ° Many evidence
rules are designed to lessen the chance that jurors will overvalue certain
evidence and to further substantive legal and social policies.'' Evidence
rules limit the information presented to the fact finder.
In contrast, discovery rules are intended to produce a free flow of
information before trial, rather than to limit it. The underlying
philosophy of the discovery rules is that "prior to trial every party to a
civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all relevant information in the
possession of any person, unless the information is privileged."'0 2
Discovery principles were developed to combat the earlier practices of
"trial by ambush" making the trial "less of a game of blind man's bluff
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent."
0 3
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the
principle that discovery's purpose is to further the information gathering
process by allowing for discovery of all evidence "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action .... The information sought need
not be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reason-
98. Discovery rulings are interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See 8 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2006, (2d ed. 1994). But see,
Kent D. Stressman, Note, Headshinkrs, Manumndws, Monqgrubbers, Nuts & Slts." Raxmninig Compld Mental
Eaminawns In &xual Harasmwd Actions Under the Cid Righu Ad of1991, 80 CORNELL L REV. 1268, 1325-29
(1995) (arguing that courts should expand the availability of interlocutory appeals in Rule 35 discovery
orders).
99. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note; see also inf/ra text accompanying note 110
(quoting language used by the Advisory Committee).
100. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 82, at 1.
101. Seeif.at2.
102. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 81, at 587 (5th ed. 1994).
103. Id. at 578.
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ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' ° The
phrase "relevant to the subject matter" has been liberally construed "to
encompass any matter that could bear on any issue that is or may be in
the case."' 5 As Professor Wright noted,
The central notion of the discovery practice set out in the rules is that
the right to take statements and the right to use them in court must be
kept entirely distinct. In this way discovery at the pretrial stage is not
fettered with the rules of admissibility that apply at a trial. The
utmost freedom is allowed at the discovery stage, but restrictions are
imposed on the use of the products of discovery in order to preserve
traditional methods of trial.
Because of these two different purposes, discovery often delves into
areas which would be inadmissible at trial but from which an attorney
may make a colorable argument that she will discover admissible
evidence. For example, one commentator noted that if a plaintiff makes
statements about her chastity, an attorney then has an argument to
discover information about the plaintiff's outside-the-workplace sexual
conduct as impeachment evidence. 7  The same commentator
suggested that defendants may encourage such "door-opening"
admissions by accusing the plaintiff in her deposition of prior "question-
able" or "loose sexual conduct" based on workplace rumors.'
Although at trial most judges will not allow an opponent to "bait" the
witness and thus open the door, during discovery counsel has much
greater latitude in asking questions. In part, that is because judges do
not monitor questions during depositions. Additionally, parties are
afforded greater latitude during discovery because discovery is the stage
of the litigation process in which the parties gather evidence to deter-
mine whether their respective claims and defenses are meritorious.'0 9
Defendants may argue that it may be impossible to distinguish meritori-
ous from spurious claims without searching discovery, some of which
will uncover information which may embarrass the plaintiff.
104. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
105. WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 587.
106. Id. at 581.
107. See Richard G. Moon &Julie Boesky, Discovay Problems and Solutions in Sex Harassment Cases, 463
PLI/Lr 63, 72 (1993). Such an approach was urged upon the court in Bara v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D.
132 (D. Haw. 1996), where the defendants argued that the plaintiffs claim that she was a strict Mormon
opened the door to extensive discovery regarding extramarital relationships to impeach the plaintiff. See
id. at 136.
108. See Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 72.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Ung-Temco-Vought, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 150, 152 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ("The
[discovery] Rules are intended to procure the truth and the factual circumstances as they relate to the
matter for the purposes of avoiding long drawn-out trials, by narrowing the points in dispute.").
142.
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The purpose of the discovery rules-to allow full exploration of
information that may lead to admissible evidence--is one reason why
Rule 412 may not adequately address a plaintiffs privacy concerns.
Another reason the Rule may be inadequate is that courts are unclear
about how to apply it in the discovery context.
2. Inadequate Directives on How The Rule Applies to Discovery
The Advisory Committee recognized that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 could prove to be an obstacle to accomplishing the goals
of Evidence Rule 412. Although it acknowledged that discovery
continues to be governed by Rule 26 it cautioned:
In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, courts
should enter appropriate orders pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)] to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries
and to ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue
protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery
makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be
relevant under the facts and theories of the particular case and cannot
be obtained except through discovery."'
Courts vary in the weight they give these advisory notes in discovery
decisions and in the way they integrate amended Rule 412 with Rule
26. Some courts have attempted to apply the Rule 412 balancing test
to discovery issues, balancing the probative value of evidence against its
potential for prejudice and harm to the victim."' However, because the
facts and issues have not been fully developed it is much more difficult
for a judge to determine what evidence may be potentially relevant, let
alone how the evidence fits into the Rule 412 balancing test. Addition-
ally, until discovery occurs, the court has not seen the evidence sought,
so it may not have the information it needs to decide the relevancy of
the evidence in the context of the facts of that case.'12 As one court
stated:
However difficult this balancing of interests may be at the time of
trial, it is substantially more difficult when made at the time of
discovery and before the facts, issues, and positions of the parties have
crystallized and before a majority of the evidence surrounding the
110. FED. R. EVID 412 advisory committee's note.
I11. Se e.g., Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 135-36; Albert v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93-C-4397, 1995 WL
117886 (N.D. II1. Mar. 15, 1995); Herchenroeder v.Johns Hopkins Univ., 171 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Md.
1997).
112. See Sanchez v. Zahibi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D.N.M. 1996).
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alleged incident is in the possession of the parties, much less before the
court. 113
Some courts have attempted to apply the Rule 412 balancing test
and have barred discovery"l4 or limited it." 5 However, other courts
have found Rule 412 inapplicable to discovery".6 or have held it does
not limit discovery because relevance for discovery purposes is very
different than relevance at trial." 7
Discovery encompasses both liability and damages. Different issues
arise when considering the relevancy of evidence to liability and to
damages. The next section begins with a discussion of how a plaintiffs
sexual history and predisposition may apply to discovery related to
liability issues. It first compares factually similar pre and post-Rule 412
decisions. It then looks at other liability discovery issues decided under
Rule 412. The final part of this section discusses cases applying Rule
412 to damages discovery issues. A review of these decisions demon-
strates that court decisions after the amendment to Rule 412 are as
divergent as they were before the amendment was enacted, and in at
least one case, a post-Rule 412 decision was more expansive in allowing
discovery than a pre-Rule 412 decision that was based upon similar
facts. 118
3. Liability Discovery Issues-A Comparison of Pre and Post-Rule
412 Cases
One way to examine the effect of Rule 412 on liability issues is to look
at similar cases decided before and after the amendment's enactment.
This subsection looks at two sets of cases with very similar facts. In one
set of cases, the post-Rule 412 court allowed broader discovery than the
pre-Rule court. In the second set of cases, the holdings of the pre- and
the post-Rule courts were virtually identical; amended Rule 412 made
no difference in the outcome.
The cases that reached different results on very similar facts involve
Title VII hostile work environment sexual harassment claims. The cases
113. Alber, 1995 WL I17886, at * i.
114. See Howard v. Historic Tours of An., 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997); Burger v. Litton Indus.,
No. 91CIV0918, 1995 WL476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995).
115. See Herchenroeder, 171 F.R.D. at 182; Sanchez, 166 F.R.D. at 503.
116. See Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-2396, 1995 WL 609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
117. See Holt v. Welch Allyn, No. 95-CV-1 135, 1997 WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).
118. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
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are Sanchez v. Zahibi, 119 a post-Rule decision, and Priest v. Rotary, 120 a pre-
Rule decision. In both Sanchez and Priest, the defendants claimed that
the plaintiffs were the sexual aggressors and thus that the defendants'
conduct was not unwelcome.' The defendants in both cases sought
information about men with whom the plaintiffs had been sexually
involved for the past ten years, arguing that the evidence was relevant
to their sexual aggressor defense.1
22
In Priest, the court declared that the only potential use for the
evidence was as propensity character evidence, suggesting that if the
plaintiff had been the aggressor in previous relationships, she was likely
to have been the aggressor in this one. 23  Because such character
evidence is inadmissible, the court reasoned that discovery of evidence
of this nature was unlikely to lead to any admissible evidence. 24 The
Priest court thus issued a protective order which prohibited the defendant
from developing this line of inquiry. 125  In doing so, it noted that,
"discovery of intimate aspects of plaintiffs' lives, as well as those of their
past and current friends and acquaintances, has the clear potential to
discourage sexual harassment litigants from prosecuting lawsuits such as
the instant one."' 126  It further found that discouraging plaintiffs from
prosecuting their claims would contravene the remedial effect intended
by Congress in enacting Title VII.
127
The post-Rule Sanchez court analyzed the situation differently.
Although it noted that Rule 412 was applicable and that it was intended
119. 166 F.R.D. 500 (D.N.M. 1996).
120. 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
121. Sanche4z 166 F.R.D. at 501; Pist, 98 F.R.D. at 756.
122. In Sanche4 the defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to answer interrogatories which asked
whether, in the previous ten years, the plaintiff: (1) had made "any personal, romantic, or sexual advances
towards any coworker... (2) had "been the subject of personal, romantic or sexual advances by a
coworker... "(3) "had a close personal, romantic, or sexual relationship, however brief, with any coworker
.166 F.R.D. at 501. If she had, for each person, she was asked to identify the person, the dates and
places oflemployment, the frequency of the advances, whether the advances were welcome or unwelcome,
whether she ever complained about the advances, and the length and duration ofany such relationships.
See UL
In Priest, among other things, the defendant sought to compel the plaintiff to answer questions about the
identity of any men with whom she had sexual relations since leaving the defendant's employment; the
identity ofeach person with whom the plaintiffhad had sex within the last ten years, and the name of each
individual who had sexually propositioned her or whom she had propositioned within the last ten years.
Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 756.
123. IN4s 98 F.R.D. at 759, 760. Rule 404(a) ofthe Federal Ru!es of Evidence prohibits the use of
evidence of character traits to prove that a person acted in conformity with that particular trait on the
occasion in question. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
124. See Piest, 98 F.R.D. at 759.
125. See id. at 762.
126. Seeid.at761.
127. Seeid.
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to protect victims of sexual misconduct from undue embarrassment and
intrusion, 2 8 the Sanchez court reasoned that, as it had not seen the
information sought, it did not have the information needed to make a
final decision on admissibility.'29 It did not attempt to articulate why the
evidence might be admissible, nor did it address the Federal Rule of
Evidence 404 propensity character issue. Instead, it tried to fashion a
compromise solution by limiting the discoverable information to three
years, and ordering that the answers be submitted under seal. 30 This
ruling thus allowed greater discovery than in Priest.
The other set of similar cases involved discovery of sexually suggestive
photographs of the plaintiff. In Holt v. Welch Alyn, "' a post-Rule 412
case, pictures taken by the plaintiff s coworker's wife showed the plaintiff
at a bachelorette party attended by a male exotic dancer. 1 2 The court
found that because the plaintiff did not object when the pictures were
shown to coworkers, the pictures may be relevant to whether her
coworkers perceived that their behavior, which included openly
displaying nude pictures of women and vaginas and subjecting Holt to
sexual and derogatory statements, was "unwanted harassment."' 33 The
court reasoned that discovery, governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, is much broader than admissibility, governed by
Evidence Rule 412'14 and thus permitted the discovery of the photos,
noting that the relevance at trial was "a matter for another day.'
3 5
This is identical to the result reached in Mitchell v. Hutchings,'36 a pre-
Rule 412 case involving Title VII and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. The court allowed discovery of sexually suggestive
pictures of the plaintiff which were displayed at the workplace and
privately displayed to coworkers on the theory that the evidence may
establish the context of the relationship between the plaintiff and her
coworkers and may have bearing on whether her coworkers thought
their conduct was welcome.' However, it noted that only the pictures
128. See Sanchez v. Zahibi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 501 (D.N.M. 1996).
129. Se id. at 502.
130. See id. The interrogatories sought to discover whether the plaintiff had made any personal,
romantic, or sexual advances toward any coworker, or had had a close, personal, romantic or sexual
relationship with any coworker. The court also limited discovery by striking the word "personal" on the
grounds it was too vague.
131. No. 95-CV-1 135, 1997 WL 210420 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).
132. See ir. at *7.
133. Id. at *7-8.
134. &e id. at *7.
135. Id. at $8.
136. 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
137. Seeid. at484.
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seen by the alleged harassers would be relevant to the Title VII claim to
determine welcomeness.'38
In Holt and Sanchez, Rule 412 did not lead to a result markedly
different than in similar cases decided before the amendment to Rule
412 was enacted. That is not to say that Rule 412 has not made any
difference. As illustrated below, in some cases the Rule has led to
limitations on discovery.'3 9
4. Other Rule 412 Liability Discovery Cases
In Howard v. Historic Tours of America," ° the defendants sought to
discover plaintiffs' personal or sexual relationships with non-harassing
coworkers. The court found that the policy underlying Rule 412-to
reduce the inhibition women felt about filing sexual harassment claims
because of the shame and embarrassment of sexual history inqui-
ies-exists equally at the discovery stage and is "not relieved by
knowledge that the information is merely sealed from public viewing..''
The court stated that permitting defendants to demand that plaintiffs
disclose sexual behavior with coworkers is "as inhibitory of their
exercising their legal rights as answering the same question at trial,""142
and that "compelling an answer which the amended rule may not
permit and protecting it from disclosure until trial.. .violates the clear
intendment of [Federal Rule of Evidence 412]." ''  Because the
requested evidence was based upon the "illogical proposition" that a
woman who welcomes a relationship with one person equally welcomes
overtures from another, the court found the evidence sought irrelevant,
or of such minimal probative value that its relevance would be out-
weighed by the other considerations of Rule 412. Because it found the
evidence had such minimal relevance, the -court reasoned that the
defendants were not unfairly prejudiced by its exclusion. According to
the court, "the defendants were not unfairly prejudiced because they
138. See id In Burs v. McGregor EL-iric Indusi, nc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993, another pre-Rule
412 case, plaintiffs coworkers brought nude magazine pictures of the plaintiff into the workplace. Although
the appellate court noted that the pictures could be relevant to the totality of the events that ensued, the
pictures could not constitute a defense to a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim when there
was no evidence that the pictures constituted an invitation to engage in sexual discourse. &e id. at 964.
139. See infra Part III.A.4.
140. 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997).
141. Id. at51.
142. Id
143. Id.
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could secure the evidence sought from others if it existed.""' Thus, the
court used Rule 412 to bar discovery of this information.
145
Another case in which Rule 412 was used to bar discovery of a
plaintiff's sexual activities was Barta v. City and County of Honolulu.'46 In
Barta, the defendants deposed the plaintiffs roommate and asked her to
describe rumors she had heard about the plaintiffs sexual relationships
in situations unrelated to the plaintiffs sexual harassment allegations. 
47
When the defendants sought additional discovery about these matters,
the plaintiff moved for a protective order. The court, using the Rule
412(b)(2) balancing test, prohibited the defendants from further inquiry
into the plaintiffs sexual relations or sexual conduct with persons other
than the named defendants or any conduct which occurred while she
was on duty or on the job site. 148  It also ordered that all further
discovery in this area be kept confidential.1
49
Finally, in Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Universiy,'5° the court used
Rule 412 to reach a compromise between the broad parameters of
discovery and the more narrow confines of Rule 412. In that case, the
defendant sought to ask the plaintiff, during a deposition, about the
plaintiffs conversations with a business associate regarding engaging in
a sexual relationship with him.'5' The court decided to permit the
questions, but not in a deposition. Instead, the court drafted two
questions it would permit the defendant to ask in interrogatories, with
permission to return to the court for broader discovery if the interroga-
tory answers indicated a need for further information.'
52
These cases illustrate the different approaches used by courts in
applying amended Rule 412 to liability discovery issues. Some courts
use the Rule to bar discovery, others refuse to apply the Rule at all, and
still others rely on the Rule to fashion a compromise-attempting to
balance the Rule's mandate to protect a plaintiffs privacy against the
principles of discovery and a defendant's need for information.
144. Id.
145. See also Burger v. Litton, No. 91CIV0918, 1995 WL 476712 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995) (making
an analogy to Rule 412 to justify barring discovery of whether a non-party witness had a sexual relationship
with any of the defendant's employees).
146. 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Haw. 1996).
147. See id. at 135.
148. Seeid. at 136.
149. Seuid
150. 171 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1997).
151. See id.at 180.
152. Seeid. at 182.
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5. Rule 412 Damages Discovery Cases
As difficult as it may be to decide how to apply Rule 412 to liability
discovery issues, the problems become even more complex when they
involve discovery regarding damages issues. In 1991, Title VII was
amended to permit plaintiffs to seek compensatory damages for
"emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary losses."' 53 These emotional
distress damages create some of the most difficult issues for courts
attempting to apply Rule 412 to discovery issues.
Defendants may seek to attribute a plaintiffs emotional distress to
some cause other than the alleged harassment. For example, they may
attempt to discover information about other potential causes, such as
abortions, other problem relationships, or childhood sexual abuse to
prove that the defendant's conduct was not a substantial cause of the
plaintiff's emotional distress. Courts that have addressed such damages
discovery requests have reached different conclusions concerning the
extent of Rule 412's protections.
In one reported case, Rule 412 failed to provide any protection for a
plaintiff. In Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc.,' 54 the plaintiffs alleged that they
suffered emotional distress and loss of self esteem as a result of work-
place sexual harassment.'55 The defendants sought to discover plaintiffs'
medical and psychiatric records, including information about "adoles-
cent problems," on the basis that they may have contained information
about conditions and experiences which may have been the cause of
some or all of the plaintiffs' emotional distress.'56 The plaintiffs objected
to the discovery on the ground that the probing of "theirjuvenile past
is exactly the kind of intrusiveness that Rule 412 was meant to stop." 157
The magistrate rejected the plaintiffs' argument, noting that Rule 412
is a rule of admissibility and that discovery remains governed by Civil
Rule 26.15 The court then found that "the requests for the medical
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). Sexual harassment plaintiffs also may seek back pay,
reinstatement, and other remedies, such as medical expenses or lost wages, necessary to make the plaintiff
whole. Plaintiffs may also seek punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994). The total of front
pay, compensatory, and punitive damages is capped at $50,000 to $300,000 depending on the number of
defendant's employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (1994); see also Debra L. Raskin, SexualHarassment in
Employmen SB42 AU-ABA 121, 163-180 (1997) (discussing cases in which the various elements of damages
were awarded).
154. Civ. A. 94-2396, 1995 WL609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
155. See id. at *2.
156. See id Defendants also sought discovery on liability issues. Defendants claimed that the records
might also lead to discovery of one of the plaintiff's sexual propensity. See id.
157. See id. at *3.
158. Seeid.
1998] 149
150 UNIVERSITh OF CLNCLNNATI L4 WREVIEW [Vol.67
records and other information appear[ed] reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the claims of emo-
tional distress by Cook and Boden [the plaintiffs] and possibly the sexual
propensities of Cook." "' The magistrate did not attempt to perform the
balancing test of Rule 412. In fact, Rule 412 played virtually no role in
this decision.
In contrast to Ramirez, the court in Bottomly v. Leucadia National'6
recognized that Rule 412 may limit damages discovery. In Bottomy, the
plaintiff claimed severe emotional distress as part of her damages in a
hostile work environment case.' 6' The court originally allowed
production of all documents relevant to plaintiff's therapist's expert
testimony on the causal relationship between the plaintiff's claims of
psychological and emotional distress. 6 2  However, it permitted the
plaintiff to redact "matters of third person diagnosis which were
irrelevant to plaintiff's condition."'63 Following the plaintiff's production
of redacted records, defendants sought full disclosure of all the plaintiff's
therapy and medical records. 1
64
The court held that although expert testimony is not required to
prove psychological damage under Title VII, 65 it is admissible as
probative of damages and causation. To rebut the plaintiff's evidence,
the defendant may "if legitimate, make an attribution of psychological
damage to another exclusive cause."' 66 However, the court also noted
that Rule 412, like Rule 404, limits discovery of evidence unrelated to
causation and damages. 167 The court decided to read the records and
plaintiff's suggested redactions to see if the requested material bore any
relevance to the causation issue."18 It noted that it would exercise
caution to make certain that the records were relevant to causation and
were calculated to lead to admissible evidence to protect the plaintiff
from a "second sexual harassment by the manner of discovery."'
159. I
160. 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Utah 1995).
161. See id. at 619.
162. Seid.
163. Id.
164. Se id.
165. See id at 619-20 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
166. Id at 620.
167. Se id.
168. See id at 621.
169. Id In a footnote, the court explained that it allowed extensive deposing of plaintiff regarding
other instances of sexual harassment during a prior employment relationship to allow defendants to explore
their "modus operandi" theory that plaintiff had a pattern of alleging sexual harassment. However, it noted
that "this allowance may not be used to justify prying into unrelated sexual activities or history that merely
attacks plaintiff's character and subjects her to harassment or unjustified embarrassment not rationally
incident to the litigation." Id. at 622 n.3.
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These two cases, like the liability issue discovery cases, demonstrate
that Rule 412 does not guarantee a sexual harassment plaintiff protec-
tion from public exposure of intimate details of her sexual history and
private life. The degree of protection Rule 412 affords depends upon a
particular judge's view of the limits Rule 412 places upon the broad
mandate of the discovery provisions. The Rule gives judges discretion
to use precautions in developing sexual history and predisposition
evidence. As shown above, how judges choose to exercise their
discretion varies gready. 7 °
B. Problems Applying Rule 412 to Cases Involving Experts
Courts face even more difficult questions concerning the applicability
of Rule 412 in cases involving expert witnesses. Experts may be used for
both liability and damages issues. They also may be used if there has
been a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological examination.'
This section examines the effect of Rule 412 in cases involving experts.
1. General Discovery Issues Involving Experts
A sexual harassment plaintiff may offer expert testimony for a number
of reasons: to help explain why the workplace was hostile, 7 2 to help
determine the contours of the objective standard of the reasonable
woman;7 3 to explain plaintiff's participation in workplace sexual
conduct or why she did not complain about such conduct;' 17 or to
170. ee supra notes 154-69.
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
172. Mark S. Dichter, Use of Expers in Seua Harassment Itigation, 505 PI/Lit 27, 43 (1994). For
example, Dr. Susan Fiske has testified about factors which increase the prevalence of sex stereotyping and
help to explain why the workplace atmosphere was hostile to women. See Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1991); sm also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
235-36 (1989) (using Dr. Fiske as an expert witness on sexual stereotyping in a sexual discrimination claim
based on failure to promote an employee).
173. See Mark S. Dichter & Mark E. Gamba, Invstigating Complaints ofSexualHarassmen, 524 PLI/Lit
129, 155 (1995) (explaining that a plaintiff may need a psychological expert to show "not only that the
plaintiff was detrimentally affected by the environment, but that a 'reasonable woman' would have been
similarly affected"); Wayne N. Outten &Jack A. Raisner, The Role of Erperts in Sexual Harassment Litigation:
Plainiffs Perspective, 505 PU/Lit 107, 114 (1994) (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that experts may be used to help the fact finder have a complete understanding of the victim's view
by providing an analysis of different perspectives of men and women). But see Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 740
F. Supp. 921 (D.P.R. 1990) (refusing to permit expert testimony on the reasonable person standard because
this testimony usurped the jury's role).
174. See Mark S. Dichter, &xualHarassmen" A New Perspectz on Litot& These Cases, 565 PLI/Lit 63,
95-96 (1997).
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support plaintiff's emotional distress damages claims.'75 Defendants may
use experts: to rebut plaintiffs' experts; to show that the plaintiffs
personality led her to misperceive workplace interactions, thereby
countering the plaintiff's claim that the workplace was a hostile
environment;'76 or to show that the defendant's conduct was not a cause
of the plaintiff's emotional distress.'77
When the plaintiff intends to use an expert to help explain why the
workplace environment was hostile, defendants may argue that all
activities in the workplace are discoverable.'78 Defendants may also
contend that the plaintiff's lifestyle outside of work may be relevant to
an expert's opinion as to what subjectively would create a sexually
intimidating environment' 79 or to determine if the defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in the plaintiffs emotional distress.' 0 Some
courts may find outside-the-workplace conduct discoverable if it serves
as a basis for the expert's opinion on the plaintiff's perceptions or
reactions. 18 1 For example, a defendant may argue that discovery of
plaintiffs childhood sexual abuse is the kind of information its expert
needs to determine whether plaintiff's personality led her to misperceive
workplace interactions.'82 As long as defendants can show that the
information requested is the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the field,183 it may be discoverable.
2. Rule 35 Examinations by Potential Experts
Connected to the expert opinion rules and privacy issues is yet
another intrusive discovery issue not dealt with by Rule 412-a Rule 35
psychological examination. When the mental condition of a party is in
controversy, upon a motion showing good cause, Rule 35 permits the
court to order the party to submit to a mental examination by a suitably
licensed or certified examiner.'84 Because sexual harassment plaintiffs
often claim they have suffered emotional distress, defendants seek
175. See Dichter & Gamba, supra note 173, at 160-63.
176. See id. at 162-63.
177. See id. at 152-53; Dichter, supra note 172, at 55-61 (citing numerous cases in which expert
testimony on causation and damages was admitted).
178. See Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 76.
179. See id. at 86.
180. SeeJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
181. See Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 87.
182. See Knoettgen v. Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 637 (Ct. App. 1990).
183. SeeFED. R. EVID. 703.
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
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permission to subject the plaintiff to a Rule 35 psychological examina-
tion.185
At least one court has held that Rule 412 does not apply to requests
for a Rule 35 examination."6 In many Rule 35 examinations, the
examining psychologist will inquire about the plaintiffs private sexual
life, asserting that it may be relevant to whether she has a personality
disorder which may have caused her to exaggerate the conduct creating
the allegedly hostile environment,'87 or it may be relevant to her
emotional distress damages. A psychiatrist seeking to assess the effect of
the alleged harassment on the plaintiff may attempt to determine the
plaintiff's psychological status before the harassment. This may involve
an exploration into *other stressors in the plaintiffs life, such as child-
hood sexual abuse, extramarital affairs, abortions, or other relationship
issues.188 In fact, defense attorneys have been advised that if a "medical
examination is allowed as part of discovery, defendants should be
careful to seek all information regarding the employee's past sexual
history both at and away from the workplace."' 89
Some courts have limited areas of inquiry in a Rule 35 exam. 190
However, even if the examiner does not seek details about the plaintiffs
sexual history, the psychological examination itself is extremely
intrusive, and Rule 412 provides no protection from a such an examina-
tion. 191
3. Issues Arising When Experts Testify At Trial
Rule 412 may do little to limit discovery when the case involves
expert witnesses. It may also be ineffective at trial when an expert seeks
185. For a discussion of the different interpretations of what constitutes "good cause" for a Rule 35
examination in sexual harassment claims, see infta ext accompanying notes 341-46.
186. Usher v. Lakewood Mfg. 158 F.R.D. 411, 412-13 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
187. See Dichter, supra note 174, at 92.
188. See Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 92; Charles C. Warner, Defending Compensatory, Punitive
andLiquidatedDamage ians  Empoyment Disciination Cases, 565 PII/Lit 535, 568-69 (1997) (noting that
once a plaintiff claims damages for emotional distress, the defendant should discover all other potential
causes of her emotional distress).
189. Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 92. They go on to note that although a plaintiff may seek
a protective order claiming that certain information is irrelevant or that the information sought is an
unreasonable intrusion into the plaintiffs private life, by merely engaging in the battle, the defendant "may
get concessions in the form of stipulations that plaintiff will not introduce certain types of evidence or will
not assert certain types of facts." Id.
190. Se Vinson v. Superior Ct., 740 P.2d 404, 410-11 (Cal. 1987) (refusing to permit questions about
sexual history). But see Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a mental
examination may include questions about sexual history).
191. For a discussion of potential solutions to the issues raised by the intrusiveness of a Rule 35
examination, see discussion infta Part IV.
1998]
154 UNIVERSIThOF CINCINA TI LA WREVIEW [Vol.67
to testify about evidence that would be inadmissible under Rule 412.
Evidence inadmissible under Rule 412 may still be admissible if it forms
the basis of an expert's opinion.'92 For example, a plaintiff's previous
abortion may be inadmissible under Rule 412; however, if there is some
evidence that the plaintiff suffered emotional trauma following the
abortion, and that the abortion occurred near the time of the alleged
sexual harassment, her abortion may come out as part of the basis of the
expert's opinion that the plaintiffs distress was caused by the abortion
rather than the defendant's conduct. 9 3 As some commentators note, it
may be possible to use all kinds of embarrassing information that a
defense psychiatrist learns through examination, which is arguably
irrelevant to the case in chief, but can be stated by the psychiatrist as
relevant to his or her opinion.' 94
4. Experts and the Discovery and Use of Evidence That the Plaintiff
Was Sexually Abused
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many sexual harassment plaintiffs
also have been victims of childhood sexual abuse.'95 Defendants seek to
discover these incidences of childhood abuse and to use the abuse at trial
to prove that the defendant is not liable because the plalntiff was "hyper-
sensitive."' 96 They also attempt to use this evidence to show that a
plaintiff has a borderline personality disorder which caused her to inter-
act in eroticized or seductive ways indicating that she "welcomed" the
192. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
193. See also Outten & Raisner, supra note 173, at 113 n.8 (noting that a psychiatrist may circumvent
the rules of evidence if the question and answer or reaction serve as part of the basis for the expert's opinion
of plaintiffs emotional or mental condition). But see Rodriguez-Hemandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d
848, 857-58 (1st Cir. 1998) (defense counsel sanctioned for disobeying court order to approach the bench
before questioning plaintiffs psychologist about plaintiffs multiple relationships with married men;
appellate court upheld sanction, noting that the defense counsel knew from deposition testimony that
plaintiff had not told her psychologist about her relationships with married men).
194. See Moon & Boesky, supra note 107, at 93-94.
195. See Lisa Bloom, Gretel Fghts Back- Representing Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs Who Were Sexualyv Abused
As Children, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN'S Lj. 1, 2-3 (1997). Apparently, no studies have been done that
examine the incidence ofchildhood sexual harassment in workplace sexual harassment plaintiffs. See id. at
I n.7. However, studies do indicate that victims of incest "are more likely to be victims of later acts of
sexual abuse, exploitation, or unwanted sexual advances than nonincest victims." Id. at 1.
196. JamesJ. McDonald & Sam P. Feldman-Schorrig, M.D., The Relevance of Childhood SexualAbuse
in Sexual Harassnent Cases, 20 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LJ. 221,224-26 (1994) (arguing that childhood sexual
abuse may make a woman more "hypersensitive" to sexual cues in the workplace). But see Michael G.
Moore, Harassmeni Claims: Defnuulig Against Disvm-y of Pchological Histo-y, N.C. LAWYERS WKLY., May 26,
1997, at 12 (arguing that it misconstrues sexual harassment law to allow a defendant to use the plaintiff's
alleged hypersensitivity to defeat liability).
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conduct.'97 Finally, defendants seek to use this evidence to show that
their conduct was not the cause of the plaintiffs current emotional
distress. '98
At least two district courts have found that Rule 412 does not cover
childhood sexual abuse because it is not "sexual behavior."' 9  It is true
that sexual abuse certainly is not "sexual" behavior and thus is not
explicitly covered by Rule 412. Additionally, some may argue that the
Rule does not cover childhood sexual abuse, because Rule 412 was
enacted to protect a sexual harassment plaintiff from use of her sexual
history to imply that she is the kind of person who would welcome
workplace advances or would not be offended by a sexualized workplace
atmosphere.00 In essence, it is a special character evidence rule for
sexual harassment plaintiffs.20' Like the character evidence rules, Rule
412 is designed to prohibit the use of a sexual harassment plaintiff's
sexual history or predisposition for propensity inferences.20 2  The
implications that childhood sexual abuse made the plaintiff hypersensi-
tive, or caused her to unconsciously act in a sexualized manner, are not
propensity inferences. Thus, arguably, the Rule's legislative history does
not support this evidence from being governed by Rule 412.
On the other hand, there is a strong argument that Rule 412 protects
plaintiffs from exposure of childhood sexual abuse as it relates to liability
issues. The Rule was enacted specifically to protect sexual harassment
plaintiff's privacy 203 and to encourage plaintiffs to file suit to redress
workplace injuries without fear of public exposure of intimate details of
their lives.2°4 There is nothing more intimate than childhood sexual
197. See McDonald & Feldman-Schorrig, supra note 196, at 226-28.
198. See, e.g., Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1226, 1242 (N.D. I1. 1995) (noting
defendant's argument that plaintiff's psychological problems stemmed from causes other than workplace
harassment and that plaintiff's reaction to the work environment was "overblown" because plaintiffwas
overly sensitive); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the magistrate
incorrectly permitted the defendant to discover personal events, such as domestic abuse and information
about personal relationships, to prove that plaintiffs' experience outside of the work environment caused
plaintiffs' emotional injuries).
199. See McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324, at *4 n. I (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 25, 1995); Ramirez v. Nabil's Inc., No. CivA 94-2396, 1995 WL609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5,1995).
200. Sw Monnin, supra note 14, at 1187 (arguing that the conception that a victim's past conduct is
reflective of her receptiveness on the occasion charged perpetuates one of the most pernicious stereotypes
undermining the effectiveness ofsexual harassment law). The Advisory Committee specifically noted that
Rule 412 is intended to protect the victim ofsexual harassment against sexual stereotyping based upon her
conduct. e FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes.
201. Rule 404, the character evidence rule, prohibits courts from allowing use of past behavior to
imply the witness acted in conformity therewith on the occasion in question. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
202. For example, a propensity inference is that the plaintiff, because she slept with ten coworkers,
is the kind of person who would welcome an advance from the eleventh coworker.
203. See REPORT, supra note 79, pt. IV.
204. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes.
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abuse, and nothing as potentially devastating to a plaintiff than to have
that abuse publicly exposed. As one court noted, "turning a case based
on the conduct of a plaintiffs coworkers into an investigation of the
plaintiff's childhood thwarts the goals of not offensively intruding into
plaintiffs' intimate lives and not unjustifiably discouraging complainants
from coming forward."2 5
Further, criminal case precedent suggests a strong argument that the
term "sexual behavior" refers to childhood sexual abuse. In both civil
and criminal cases, Rule 412 uses the term "sexual behavior, 21 6 and the
definition of sexual behavior does not differ in criminal and civil
actions." 7 The policies underlying the enactment of the criminal
portion of the rule-to protect the victim from unwarranted intrusions
into her privacy, to encourage her to report the rape, and to limit the
use of evidence that has low probative value and a high potential for
misuse208 --are the same policies underlying the enactment of the civil
rule.20 9 In criminal cases, courts routinely have found that Rule 412
covers childhood sexual abuse.21
However, even if Rule 412 protects a plaintiff from use of childhood
sexual abuse evidence at trial, it may not protect plaintiffs when it comes
to discovery. A defendant may argue that the abuse, rather than the
defendant's conduct, was the sole or substantial cause of the plaintiff's
emotional injury, 211 or that the plaintiff had pre-existing emotional
distress and the defendant should only be responsible for "aggravation"
damages. This contention has led many courts to allow defendants
205. Knoettgen v. Superior Ct. 273 Cal. Rptr. 636,638 (Ct. App. 1990) (discussing similar California
evidentiary rule). For an in-depth discussion ofnocttgen, see inf'a notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
206. For the full text of Rule 412, see supra note 8.
207. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
208. Se, e.g., Sakthi Murphy, Comment, Rodcg Unrwsonable ,aidF__peclainns: Limits on UsingA Rape
Victim's Sxual Histoty to Show dieDefendant'sMistamz &&ifin Consent, 79 CAL L REV. 541, 551-52 (noting that
rape shield statutes were enacted, among other reasons, to protect rape victims' privacy, to encourage
victims to come forward, and to enhance the accuracy of the outcomes in rape trials by excluding irrelevant
and prejudicial evidence).
209. See supra notes 8-1 and accompanying text (explaining the reasons Rule 412 was amended to
include civil claims).
210. S*, e.g., United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting defendants failed to
file a formal motion as required by Rule 412 regarding the defendants' intent to introduce evidence of
sexual abuse by non-defendant family members); United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 36 (6th Cir.
1985) (finding no abuse ofdiscretion in ruling inadmissible under federal "rape shield" rule evidence that
13-year-old victim had reported other incidents of sexual assault by non-defendant family members);
United States v. Begay, 937 F.2d 515, 519-23 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that refusal to admit other instances
of childhood sexual abuse did not comport with the exception in Rule 412(b)(1)(c) which allows such
evidence if its admission is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights).
211. See infra note 213 for cases in which the defendant made this argument.
212. In determining liability for emotional distress damages in Title VII cases, courts have used tort
negligence principles. See, e.g.,Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1292-94 (8th Cir. 1997).
156
1998] RULE 412 LAID BARE
to conduct discovery about the plaintiffs childhood sexual abuse.213 If
defendants have sufficient evidence that a plaintiff's childhood sexual
abuse, rather than the alleged abuse, caused the plaintiffs damages,
evidence of such childhood sexual abuse will be admissible at trial.2' 4
In sum, some courts refuse to apply Rule 412 to instances of child-
hood sexual abuse, while others believe that defendants have the right
to investigate a plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse, at least during
discovery. Thus, the exploration of a plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse,
at trial and during discovery, is yet another reason Rule 412 has a
limited ability to protect a plaintiff from exposing very private and
painful information.
C. The Effect of Gender Bias and the Rule's Discretionary Nature
Unlike in criminal cases, in civil cases Rule 412 does not bar evidence
unless it falls within a particular exception. 215 Instead, the civil rule
requires that judges perform a balancing test.2 6  This balancing test
affords judges somewhat greater discretion when applying Rule 412 in
civil cases than they have in criminal cases.217  Because of the discretion
In tort law, a negligent actor is liable for the harm to another, even if the harm is greater than that which
a reasonable person should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 461. However, defendants are only liable for those damages they caused. If part of the
plaintiff's damage is attributable to other causes, the defendant must only compensate the plaintiff for the
"aggravation" or activation of the pre-existing condition. Se W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984). Courts are undecided if the doctrine
involving a pre-existing condition is limited to physical conditions or whether it extends to underlying
emotional conditions. Seeljenson, 130 F.3d at 1293.
A pre-existing condition is different than an "eggshell skull plaintiff." With an eggshell skull plaintiff,
the plaintiffmay have been particularly vulnerable, but, until the time of the incident, she was not injured.
In fact, but for the defendant's conduct, she may have continued throughout her life being particularly
vulnerable, but that vulnerability would not have manifested itself in an injury. On the other hand, if a
plaintiffwas injured prior to the defendant's conduct, rather than being merely susceptible to a more severe
injury than the aveage person, the plaintiff may only recover damages for the injury caused by the
defendant's conduct. See KEETON, supra note 212, at 292.
213. See, e.g., Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1295-98; Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., No. Civ.A. 94-2396, 1995 WL
609415 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995); Mc~leland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95 C 23, 1995 WL 571324,
at *2 (N.D. I11. Sept. 25, 1995). But see infa notes 303-09 and accompanying text (discussing Knoettgen v.
Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1990)).
214. See McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324 (N.D. III. 1995).
215. In criminal cases, Rule 412 bars admission of sexual history or predisposition evidence unless
the evidence is (1) introduced to prove a person other than the accused was the source of semen, injury or
other physical evidence, (2) offered to prove consent, or (3) if the exclusion would violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. Se FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
216. In civil cases, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or predisposition of any alleged
victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger
of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. See FED. R. EVil). 412(b)(2).
217. But see Hunter, supra note 75, at 138 (arguing that criminal rape shield statutes have too many
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ary nature of the rule, subconscious gender-biased attitudes may play a
greater role in the civil rule's application.
This section discusses the empirical evidence of gender bias in the
courts and how that bias manifests itself in the judicial decision-making
process. This section looks at gender bias in its broadest sense, as it
applies to all women. However, the effect of gender-biased attitudes
may not be the same for all women. The impact of gender bias may be
compounded by a plaintiffs racial or ethnic heritage, economic or class
background, or sexual orientation." 8 Additionally, some of the same
attitudes that lead to decisions affected by gender bias also may lead to
the application of subconscious stereotypical views in same-sex sexual
harassment claims.219
1. Gender Bias Studies
Even ifjudges intend to be fair and objective, sex-based stereotypes
and beliefs often may subconsciously affect their decisions. As Justice
Blackmun stated, "[o]ne's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure
to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's
attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral
standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and color one's thinking and conclusions."220
Although most lawyers and judges "aspire to equal treatment of all,"
their "success does not always match aspirations. '221 Numerous studies
by state and federal courts document that gender bias plays a role in the
exceptions which allow courts too much discretion and that the new Rule 412 allows even broader
exceptions in civil cases).
218. See, e.g., id at 127-28 (noting that many feminist theorists criticize the use of the generalized
categories of "women" and "gender bias" as reflecting only the experience of white, heterosexual, middle
class women and ignoring the various intersections of race, class, and sexual oriuitation with gender);
Kathryn Abrams, Tatle VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2498-2502 (1994)
(discussing the need to acknowledge and account for the intersection of race and gender in Title VII sexual
harassment claims).
219. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), the Supreme Court held that
same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII. See i at 1003. It is not hard to imagine that, just as
judges believe that women who voluntarily have sex with one male coworker welcome advances from
another male coworkerjudges may believe that a lesbian would welcome advances from female coworkers.
220. Nicole D. Rizzolo, Comment, A Right with Q estionable Bitr 7he Future of 'Abusive or Hostile Work
Envirnment",Scud Harassment as a Cause ofAction for Women in a Gender-Biased Society and Legal System, 23 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 263, 273 n.52 (1988); see also Brown, supra note 2, at 459-60 (noting that there is no such
thing as a neutral judge).
221. FINAL REPORT OFTHENINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (1993), reprinted in THE
EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS; THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER
BIAS TASK FORCE, 67 S. CAL L REV. 745 (1994) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT].
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behavior and attitudes of judges and other participants in the legal
system, and in sexual harassment claims.222
Gender bias has been defined as "any action or attitude that interferes
with impartial judgment. 22 3 It occurs when
[D]ecisions are made or actions are taken based upon preconceived
or stereotypical notions about the nature, roles, and abilities of women
and men, rather than upon an evaluation of each individual or his or
her situation .... Gender bias does not require deliberate intent and
often arises from a lack of knowledge. 224
There is no way to know how often overt manifestations of hostile
sexist attitudes or gender bias occur in sexual harassment cases;
however, there is no question that these attitudes exist. For example,
one judge allegedly announced in open court "that a plaintiff's sexual
harassment claim was not serious because her employer only stared at
her breasts, rather than touching them, and most women like that. 225
In another case, a state appellate court found that the trial judge had
made no secret of the fact that he found sexual harassment cases
detrimental to everyone concerned and a misuse of the judicial
system.22' The judge's hostility toward the plaintiff's sexual harassment
claim was so strong that the appellate court overturned the verdict on
the ground that the judge's gender bias deprived the plaintiff of her due
process right to a fair trial.227
In addition to overt gender-biased conduct such as that described
above, subtle forms of gender bias also exist. For example, women
victims of sexual offenses historically have been thought of as fabricating
the alleged sexual offense and their testimony has been considered
inherently unreliable. 28  That attitude has not disappeared. 2 9  The
222. See, e.g., id at 883-92; REPORT OF THE WORKING COMMITTEES To THE SECOND CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, app. A, at 285-91 (1997)
[hereinafter SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT]. At least forty-three state task forces have studied gender bias in
the courts. For a list of those state task forces, see Marsha S. Stem, CourtingJutic.- Addressing GenCdr Bias in
thJeudi ia/System, 96 ANN. SURV. AM. L 1, n.5-6 (1996).
223. Case Comment, Commisuinon Gen tr Fainess in the Courts, nprintedin 72 N.D. L REV. 1115, 1129
(1996).
224. Report ofthe Maine Commission on Gender, Justie, and the Courts, 49 ME. L REV. 135, 138 (1997);
Comment, supra note 223, at 1130.
225. SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 222, app. A., at 285.
226. See Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440,446 (Ct. App. 1995).
227. See id.
228. As late as 1970, Professor Wigmore, a renowned evidence treatise author, recommended that
women complainants in criminal sexual offense cases be psychologically examined to determine if they were
credible. 3 AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924, at 736-37 (1970).
229. In Catchpole, the appellate court determined that the trial judge found the plaintiff was not
credible based on stereotyped thinking about women and misconceptions of the social and economic
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Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force found that women's testimony is
often "disbelieved or discounted as complaints about life rather than as
providing evidence of legally cognizable harms."23 The New York
Task Force on Gender Bias noted that, often, women plaintiffs and
witnesses are seen as overly emotional, hypersensitive, and prone to
exaggerate.23'
How can one determine whether these attitudes affect the judicial
decision-making process in sexual harassment claims? The Ninth
Circuit Task Force suggests that one way to ascertain whether gender
bias affects the decision-making process is to examine district court
opinions. The task force reviewed all reported sexual harassment
opinions betweenJanuary 1987 and December 1991 and found a very
high reversal rate. In twenty-three of twenty-six appellate court
decisions, defendants prevailed in the trial courts. On appeal, fifty-two
percent of those cases were reversed in full or in part.232 The published
opinions studied also indicated that the majority of sexual harassment
claims were dismissed by the district courts, either by granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.2 3
From this data, the task force concluded that "[t]he approach to sexual
harassment cases taken by the district courts often reflects both a
restrictive application of the law to sex discrimination claims in general
and an impatience with these cases."23'
The task force also conducted focus groups consisting of plaintiffs'
attorneys and defense attorneys from the public and private sectors. 235
Plaintiffs' attorneys participating in the focus groups reported that in
sexual harassment cases before male judges, the judges minimized their
clients' trauma.3 They also reported an "across the board lack of
understanding" as to the female plaintiff's situation and point of view.237
Focus group participants also noted that judges were more "impatient"
and less interested in these "small stakes" 238 cases than their state court
realities many women confront. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454; see also Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibiliy in the
Courts: Why is There a Gender Gap? JUDGESJ., Winter 1995 at 5 (1995).
230. NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 221, at 955.
231. See Rizzolo, supra note 220, at 279 (citing the New York Task Force Report, at 185).
232. See NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 221, at 886. The report does not note whether this
statistic differs from other types ofemployment discrimination claims, nor does it note how the reversal rate
compares to the general reversal rate.
233. See i
234. See id. at 886.
235. See id. at 884.
236. See id. at 887.
237. Id
238. Only recently has Title VII been amended to allow for compensatory and punitive damages.
The study did not discuss whether this change in the law is likely to change judicial attitudes about the
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judicial counterparts." 9 Additionally, many of these cases are referred
to magistrate judges, the vast majority of whom are men."4 Focus
group participants noted that several of the magistrate judges were
openly biased against or uncomfortable with female litigants in employ-
ment cases.24'
The Second Circuit Task Force attempted to replicate the Ninth
Circuit Task Force's methodology.242  It, too, studied lower court
opinions and reversal rates. Because of its small sample size, it found
reversal rates inconclusive but suggestive of "reasons for concern" and
"cause for further study. ' 243 Even in its small sample size, this task force
found evidence that some federal judges are impatient with sexual
harassment claims and express stereotypical thinking about the
seriousness of the claims.244  To illustrate their point, the task force
reported that:
In one instance, a district court judge expressed considerable
skepticism that a woman who was not fired and who got promotions
and pay raises during the period in which her supervisor allegedly
demanded sexual favors, could nevertheless be found to have suffered
legally cognizable emotional injuries if her claims were proven. In
another case, the lower court's handling of it suggested a belief on the
judge's part that the plaintiff's consumption of alcohol at a business
dinner, rather than the egregious misconduct of her fellow employees,
was the proximate cause of her rape. In a third, the judge unexpect-
edly awarded summary judgment to the defendant on the merits-a
ruling requested by neither side, and made despite the fact that
neither plaintiff nor defendant had yet addressed in detail any issue in
the litigation except for jurisdictional questions. 245
Judges' lack of receptivity to sexual harassment claims may be
attributed to reasons other than gender bias. As the Second Circuit
value of these cases. Although compensatory damages are statutorily capped at $50,000 to $300,000,
depending on the number of employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(a) (1994), there is no cap on punitive damages.
Thus, sexual harassment cases can be potentially "big money" claims. For example, ajury awarded Rena
Weeks, a secretary at the law firm of Baker & McKenzie, $7.1 million, which the appellate court reduced
to $3.8 million. &e Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Ct. App. 1998). Recently Chevron
settled a claim by four female employees for $2.2 million. See Douglas Robson, Huge Surge of Sexual
Harassment Cases Hits the Courts, S.F. Bus. TIMEs, May 16, 1997, at 12A. Mitsubishi settled a sexual
harassment lawsuit for $34 million. See Judge O/i Mitsubishi Settement, CHI. TRIB.,June 24, 1998, at IA.
239. See NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 221, at 887.
240. Seeid.at889. '
241. Set id. This data is particularly relevant to the scope of discovery in sexual harassment cases
because magistrate judges often make discovery rulings.
242. See SECOND CIRCUrr REPORT, supra note 222, at 283-89.
243. See id. at 289.
244. See id at 289-290.
245. Id. at 290.
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Task Force noted, some judges may dislike these claims because of a
perception that these cases do not belong in the federal system, but
instead should be handled by administrative agencies. 246
Obviously, not all decisions adverse to plaintiffs are due to gender-
biased attitudes. However, it is important to recognize that even well-
intentioned judges who believe they are free from stereotypical beliefs
may be subconsciously applying stereotypical beliefs in the decision-
making process.
2. How Subconscious Gender-Biased Attitudes May Affect the
Decision-Making Process
Stereotypes are a cognitive strategy people use to help themselves
efficiendy process information.247 The problem with stereotypes is that
they have "the virtue of efficiency, but not of accuracy. ' 248
Professor Jody Armour developed a model, based on empirical
research, that helps explain how subconscious stereotypical attitudes
influence legal decision makers.249 Professor Armour distinguishes
stereotypical attitudes from prejudicial ones. He posits that stereotypes
are well-learned sets of associations established early in childhood,
before individuals have the cognitive ability to decide rationally whether
to accept the associations. 25 °  Prejudice, on the other hand, is the
"endorsement or acceptance of the content of a negative cultural
stereotype. '25' Social scientists classify people who consciously endorse
and accept stereotypical views as high-prejudiced persons; those who
have thought about cultural stereotypes and recognize them as
inappropriate bases for relating to others and deliberately reject them
are classified as low-prejudiced persons.252 However, even low-
prejudiced people may apply stereotypes in the decision making process.
Professor Armour argues that this is because stereotypical views are
constandy reinforced by the social environment, including the mass
media.253 Nonprejudiced personal beliefs are newer cognitive structures
246. See id at 279.
247. SeeJudith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination
Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening The 7udicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY LJ. 1487, 1494-95 (1997) (discussing
social and cognitive psychologists' findings about stereotypes).
248. See Anita Cava, Taking judiial Notice of Sexual StereOping, 43 ARK. L REV. 27, 32 (1992).
249. SeeJody Armour, Stereo_4pes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Proudice Habit, 83
CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995).
250. Seei at741.
25 1. See id. at 742.
252. See id
253. See id at 743. For example, there was significant coverage ofa case in whichJerold MacKenzie
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that result from a low-prejudiced person's conscious decision that
stereotype based responses are unacceptable.254 Because stereotypes
have a longer history and greater frequency of activation than the more
recently acquired personal beliefs,255 stereotypes may be "activated
automatically in perceivers' memories and can affect subsequent social
judgments. 256 In essence, the application of stereotypes is like a bad
habit--something which can be broken, but only with a conscious
effort.257 It is a difficult thing to do because sometimes judges may not
even realize they hold these views,258 and thus do not consider the
stereotypes when applying Rule 412.259
discussed a "Seinfeld" episode in whichJerry could not remember the name of a woman he was dating, all
he could recall is that her name rhymed with a female body part. When MacKenzie's coworker could not
figure out the joke, MacKenzie showed her a dictionary page with the word "clitoris" on it. The coworker
complained that the dictionary display was sexual harassment. There had also been a previous complaint
about MacKenzie sexually harassing a coworker. After the "Seinfeld" episode conversation, MacKenzie
was fired for sexual harassment. He sued for wrongful discharge and won a multi-million dollar verdict.
His case received a great deal of publicity, the tone of which was that the jury sent a message that men and
women should be free to talk to one another at work without fear of someone claiming sexual harassment.
See, eg., TheN.zi, 1997 WL 11863413 (MSNBC television broadcastJune 27, 1997) (interview and story
with Brian Williams); Today Show Interview,July 16, 1997, 1997 WL 11221703; 1997 WL 11221704;
see also, Dan Lynch, Fe Frst, Ask Q aestions Onoy Laler, TIMES UNION ALB. June 27, 1997, at B 1 (writing an
editorial claiming an innocent man had been discharged for sexual harassment without ever having a
chance to give his side of the story and noting that "[w]hite guys under 40 ... have no legal protection");
Robson, supra note 238, at 12A (commenting on how plaintiffs bring sexual harassment claims to make
money or simply because they are hypersensitive to normal workplace banter). The media portrayal of the
unusual sexual harassment claim, or the claim in which there is a multi-million dollar award, is bound to
influence public opinion about the validity of sexual harassment suits in general,just as media coverage of
punitive damage awards has influenced public perception about those awards. For a discussion of the
influence of media coverage on punitive damage awards, see Marc Galanter, 77L Regulatogy Function ofthe
Civil Jny, in VERDICT, ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 61, 84-85 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Peter
H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate onusy Refom, in VERDICT, ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 306, 308-14
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
254. See Armour, supra note 249, at 755-56.
255. See id at 756.
256. Id at 758.
257. See id at 756-57.
258. As one judge noted, "Until I was on this Gender Bias Task Force, there never was any gender
bias in my court." NINTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 22 1, at 949.
259. For example, thejudge in Hdinwdr v.jlihns Hopkins Unima'sipy was concerned about protecting
the plaintiff's privacy. 171 F.R.D. 179, 182 D. Md. 1997). However, the judge assumed that the plaintiff's
relationship with her business associate was relevant to her manager's perceptions of whether his overtures
were welcome. See isL By assuming that the relationship was relevant, the judge accepted the stereotypical
idea that a woman who has an intimate relationship with one man welcomes overtures from another. The
judge allowed the defendant to inquire about the plaintiff's relationship with her business associate through
interrogatories. See id
In Myr-Dupuis v. ThornsomNospapers, Inc., No. 96-2063, 1997 WL 809955 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1997), the
court applied the stereotypical view that a woman's sexualized bantering with some coworkers was relevant
to conduct she found acceptable from her manager. See id at *1-2. Thus the court considered evidence
of plaintiff's sexual conversations in "public" work areas, outside the alleged harassing coworker's presence,
relevant to whether the plaintiff welcomed the harasser's touching of her arms, shoulders, and breasts, his
sexual propositions and other vulgar language, and his uninvited visits to her home. See id
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3. How Gender-Biased Views Impact the Admissibility of Evidence
in Sexual Harassment Claims
In order to "break the stereotype habit," one must first recognize the
stereotype. This section discusses various stereotypes applied in sexual
harassment claims and explains why the stereotypical view may be
inaccurate in any given case. 60
One sexual stereotype is that women who welcome sexual overtures
from one coworker may welcome advances or similar interchanges from
other coworkers. 261 As one court recently noted, this view is "premised
on three hopelessly illogical propositions:"
(1) [T]hat a woman who has a sexual relationship with one co-
employee is so morally degraded that she welcomes a similar
relationship with any other employee; (2) that a woman who is
sexually attracted to one employee and yields to that attraction is
equally attracted to any other employee and would welcome his
advances; and (3) that a woman who has a sexual relationship with
one employee welcomes the sexual advances of another employee, no
matter how gross, crude and boorish. 2
Another stereotype that rests on equally illogical grounds is that
women who engage in extramarital affairs or in other sexual activity
outside of work will not be offended by sexual actions or a sexual
atmosphere at work.6 3 The idea that women who accept, or engage in,
various kinds of sexual conduct outside the workplace cannot be
offended by a highly sexualized work environment ignores the fact that
women choose the conduct in which they want to engage, or the
conduct they will accept from others, outside the workplace.264
260. Men, as well as women, are harmed by sexual stereotypes. See Cava, supra note 248, at 44-45;
see also gerralwJudith Bond Jennison, The &archfor Equahy in a Woman's WorU. Faders'Rights to Custody, 43
RUTGERS L REV. 1141 (1991) (discussing use of sexual stereotypes in child custody cases).
261. See Sensibello v. Globe Security Sys. Co., No. 814052, 1984 WL 1118, at *8 (D.C. Pa.Jan. 10,
1 984); Herchenrder, 171 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1997). For additional cases applying this stereotype and
the stereotypes to be discussed, see Brown, supra note 2.
262. Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D. D.C. 1997); see also Bums v.
McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993) (arguing that to consider plaintiffs conduct
outside of work in determining whether she welcomed sexual advances at work, would allow a complete
stranger to kiss or fondle a woman just because she accepts this conduct from her husband or boyfriend);
Juliano, supra note 18, at 1591-92 (stating that to "impute a woman's behavior with one man to all other
men ... would rid women of personal choice, identity and freedom").
263. See, e.g., Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, 27 F.3d 1316, 1322 (8th Cir. 1994)
(extramarital affair); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993) (posing nude for
a magazine).
264. See Bums, 989 F.2d at 963.
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Choosing to engage in conduct differs from having it forced upon a
person because of the power inequities in a workplace situation. What
one does in one's free time should have no relevance when judging the
kind of conduct one expects from workplace colleagues.
Another stereotypical view that has manifested ,itself in some court
decisions is that women who dress in a certain way invite harassment.265
As Professor Susan Estrich notes, the problem with the assumption that
dressing in a certain way is an invitation for sexual overtures is that it
ignores the fact that some women take pride in their bodies and dress for
themselves. It also does not consider that some women dress in a
particular way to be attractive to their spouses and boyfriends, or in
order to go out directly after work.266
Another gender-biased view often seen in cases is that women who
use vulgar language with some colleagues invite, or are not offended by,
abusive language and actions from others.267 This view fails to account
for the fact that people make choices about to whom they want to talk
and in what manner. A person may feel comfortable having a certain
level of bantering with one coworker and not with another.268
Another stereotype is that of the hypersensitive plaintiff who
overreacts to normal workplace banter.269 Courts must remember that
what is harmless and what is an overreaction is in the eyes of the
265. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (noting that the way a woman dresses
may be relevant to whether an alleged harasser believed his conduct was welcome); Reed v. Shepard, 939
F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the plaintiff may have contributed to her harassment because
she wore a t-shirt with no bra to work).
266. See Estrich, supra note 7, at 828-29.
267. See, e.g., Myer-Dupuis v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., No. 96-2063, 1997 WL 809955 (6th Cir.
Dec. 19, 1997) (finding plaintff's sexually provocative conversations with coworkers, other than the alleged
harasser, occurring in "public" work areas relevant to alleged harasser's perception of welcomeness);
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (disagreeing with the district court's
assessment that because the plaintiff was "legendary for talking like a drunken sailor" she welcomed her
manager's abusive comments and conduct); Red, 939 F.2d at 486-88 (plaintiff's use ofvulgar language and
participation in sexualized practical jokes precluded a finding of a hostile work environment, despite the
fact that the plaintiffwas hit and punched in the kidneys, had a cattle prod with an electrical shock placed
between her legs, was handcuffed to the toilet and had her face pushed into the water, and was maced).
268. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text (discussing why it is wrong to find that a woman
who has sex with one colleague welcomes overtures from other colleagues). Additionally, this view does
not account for the fact that often, women try to fit in to a workplace by adopting norms set by male
coworkers. See Monnin, supra note 14, at 1192-94. It is also a back door way of getting in character
evidence to show that a plaintiff has a propensity to act in a certain manner and thus her character does
not lend itself to offense. See id at 1182.
269. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableess in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1177, 1207 (1990) (noting that many men tend to view "milder" forms of
harassment, "such as suggestive looks, repeated requests for dates, and sexist jokes as harmless social
interactions to which only overly sensitive women would object"); see also Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990) (noting that sexual harassment defendants must be protected from
hypersensitive plaintiffs); accord Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
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beholder. When a court dismisses a plaintiff's claim because she was
hypersensitive or overreacted, it often marginalizes the woman's
experience or discounts her perception of the event27° simply because
the judge would have perceived the event differently.
Rule 412 aims to raise judicial awareness of the dangers of injecting
sex-based stereotypes into the decision-making process. However,
because application of stereotypical views often occurs almost automati-
cally,27' unless judges make a conscious effort to educate themselves
about gender bias issues and to be aware of any proclivity to apply
stereotypical views, Rule 412 has a limited ability to affect the decision-
making process.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Existing sexual harassment law requires a plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's conduct was unwelcome and that she found this conduct
created a hostile work environment.272 Many scholars have written
about the need to change the substantive law and have advanced
various proposals on how to do so. 273 Changing the substantive law
might alter what evidence would be considered relevant.27 4 This section
examines whether, without a change in the substantive law, more can
be done to protect plaintiffs' privacy while not impinging on defendants'
right to pursue and develop a meaningful defense to sexual harassment
claims. This section also examines the feasibility of further constraints
on judicial discretion through the enactment of a more restrictive
evidentiary rule and a parallel discovery rule.
A. A More Restrictive Evidentia.y Rule
As discussed thus far, in many cases, Rule 412 has had little, if any,
effect on some defendants' ability to delve into a plaintiffs personal life
and sexual history. One way to ensure that Rule 412 guards against
270. SeeAnita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, I I HARV. L. REV. 445, 502 (1997)
(discussing how feminist scholars have found that the hyperscnsitivity argument marginalizes the plaintiff's
perspective).
271. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Armour's work).
272. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
273. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 7; Radford, supra note 12; Vhay, supra note 17.
274. For example, Professor Susan Estrich argues that the welcomeness prong of the substantive law
be eliminated. See Estrich, supra note 7, at 858. If this were done, and ifthe law did not require proofof
"subjective hostility," evidence of a woman's sexual history or predisposition would be irrelevant except in
cases with emotional distress damages issues.
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"unwarranted intrusion into the victim's private life," '275 is to amend the
Rule so that it bars evidence of plaintiffs conduct with any person other
than the alleged harasser.276 For instance, a manager may believe that
the plaintiffs conduct with coworkers means that she would welcome
overtures from him.277 Even with the amended Rule, many courts still
consider the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiffs conduct with others
relevant to the defendant's claim that he thought his conduct was
welcome.278 If the evidence was limited to a plaintiffs interactions with
her alleged harasser, a defendant's ability to present evidence on which
he based his assumption that his overtures were welcome would be
limited to evidence of the plaintiffs interactions with the defendant. Is
it fair to a defendant to keep him from presenting evidence that he
assumed, albeit mistakenly, that if the plaintiff welcomed overtures from
a coworker she was open to overtures from the defendant?
In the criminal context, by enacting the original rape shield statute,
Congress made it clear that a perpetrator's perception of consent, based
upon the woman's consensual sex with others, should not play a role in
the decision-making process.'" In our legal system, criminal defendants
are given great leeway in introducing evidence in their defense, in some
cases, much greater leeway than civil parties.28 Yet in sexual miscon-
duct cases, the tables are turned and it is the civil defendant, rather than
the criminal defendant, who is given much greater leeway in introducing
evidence of a woman's past and her conduct with others. If we find the
evidentiary restrictions sufficient to protect the rights of criminal
defendants, should similar restrictions not be sufficient to protect civil
defendants? A civil defendant's incorrect perception of welcomeness,
based upon the sexually stereotypical view that a woman who welcomes
275. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
276. SeegenerayJuliano, supra note 18, at 1590-91; Radford, supra note 12, at 532-33 (arguing that
to prove welcomeness only actions directed to the alleged harasser by the target should be considered); see
also B. Glenn George, ThBack Door: LgiizingSexualHarasmw Claims, 73 B.U. L REV. 1, 30 (1993)
(suggesting that the fact that plaintiff told crude jokes is relevant only if the defendant allegedly was making
crude jokes to the plaintiff).
277. See Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting
evidence of employee's sexually explicit conversations with coworkers may be relevant to show plaintiff
welcomed sexual antics of her manager, evidence was excluded because defendants failed to comply with
Rule 412(c) notice requirements).
278. See iil; see also Herchenroeder v.John Hopkins Univ., 171 F.R.D. 179 (D. Md. 1997); Swentek
v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987); Myer-Dupuis v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., No. 96-2063,
1997 WL 809955 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1997).
279. Rule 412 eliminated the ability of criminal defendants to use evidence of the plaintiffs sexual
relationships with others to argue that the plaintiff consented to sex with the defendant. See FED. R. EVID.
412.
280. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (permitting a criminal defendant to introduce evidence of the
defendant's good character but prohibiting a civil party from doing so except in very limited circumstances).
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overtures from one man welcomes them from all men, is no more
probative in a determination of whether the plaintiff welcomed the
conduct than a criminal defendant's incorrect perception of consent in
a rape case. An evidentiary rule limiting evidence of sexual interactions
to those between the plaintiff and alleged harasser would eliminate the
application of this sexual stereotype.
However, a more stringent evidentiary rule has some potential
problems. First, if Rule 412 limits evidence of a woman's sexual history
or predisposition to situations involving the alleged harasser, the Rule
would not encompass all potential sexual misconduct claims. For
example, a rule limiting evidence of a plaintiff's sexual conduct to
behavior that occurred only between the complainant and harasser
would not account for a case likejudd v. Rodman,28' in which the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, basketball star Dennis Rodman, gave her
herpes. In Judd, a critical part of Rodman's defense was to prove that
the plaintiff had sexual relations with many other men. A rule which
would not have allowed admission of evidence of the plaintiffs other
sexual relationships would have left Rodman with no defense.
To solve this kind of problem, the rule could be limited to sexual
harassment suits. However, then the rule would be written to deal with
one very particular subset of cases, something which the rules seldom do
because they are not designed to cover each particular category of case,
but rather are designed to be broad enough to cover all actions. 282 Of
course, evidentiary rules do exist which cover specific subsets of cases.
For example, there are specific evidentiary rules for child molestation 283
and sexual assault. 4 cases. When Rule 403 fails to adequately advance
social policies, Congress creates categorical limitations to further certain
public policies.285 When it amended Rule 412, Congress noted that
there is a strong public policy interest in encouraging victims of
workplace sexual harassment to report and pursue their claims.286
Certainly, creating a rule of evidence that better advances this policy
than the current Rule would not be uncharacteristic Congressional
action.
Another problem with drafting a more restrictive evidentiary rule is
that the rule would be addressing the law as it exists today. Sexual
harassment law largely has been created by judicial interpretation of the
281. 105 F.3d 1339(llthCir. 1997).
282. SeeJ. Alexander Tanford & AnthonyJ. Bocchino, Rape Victin Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 551 (1980).
283. See FED. R. EVID. 414.
284. See FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
285. See Monnin, supra note 14, at 1184-85.
286. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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broad mandate of Tide VII. It has evolved greatly in the past thirty
years and it will continue to evolve. This was an issue confronted by the
Advisory Committee as it strived to fashion a rule that would account
for changes in this rapidly developing area of law.287 However, this
problem is not insurmountable. Although it is not ideal to change
evidentiary laws frequently, if the substantive law changed, the rule
could be amended.
Even if a more restrictive evidentiary rule could be justified in a
liability context, a rule limiting evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history or
conduct to that which occurred between the plaintiff and her alleged
harasser may severely, and unfairly, hamper a defendant's ability to
present a defense to plaintiff's claimed damages. If the plaintiff claims
extraordinary emotional distress damages288 and extraordinary medical
expenses, it would be unfair, unprecedented, and perhaps a due process
violation to prohibit the defendant from attempting to prove those
damages are attributable to some other exclusive cause.289 A potential
solution to this dilemma is to write the rule providing for a damages
issue exception. For example, the rule could permit evidence of a
plaintiff's sexual history or conduct if necessary to defend against an
extraordinary damages claim.290
Another problem with a more stringent version of Rule 412 is that
it may be of limited utility if a case involves expert testimony. If
evidence of a plaintiffs sexual history or predisposition or conduct with
others in the workplace is the kind of evidence reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field, it may be discoverable, and it may be admissible
as the basis of an expert opinion at trial.29 ' However, courts have
287. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note (noting that subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 412
employs a balancing test rather than the specific exceptions set forth in the criminal rape shield law because
of the difficulty in foreseeing future developments in the law and the need for greater flexibility to
accommodate evolving causes of action such as sexual harassment).'
288. Extraordinary damages are those that go beyond what one would expect to be the normal
emotional trauma that a sexually harassed plaintiffwould suffer. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,
22 (1993) (noting that Title VII does not require a plaintiff to suffer concrete psychological harm). For
example, if a plaintiff claimed that the harassment caused hospitalization or that she was permanently
disabled because of the emotional trauma, those would be extraordinary damages. However, a single claim
that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendant's conduct would not be considered
extraordinary damages. See infra notes 296-330 and accompanying text (discussing California evidentiary
rule).
289. See, e.g., McCleland v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
25, 1995).
290. For a discussion of what might constitute an extraordinary damages claim, see supra note 288.
291. See Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat'l, 163 F.R.D. 617 (D. Utah 1995) (noting that under Rule 703
discovery must be allowed as to all material evidence that plaintiffs' experts could reasonably rely on to
address the relevant issues in the case and that defendants may also obtain information needed by their
experts to form a basis for any counter opinion); see also supra Part III.B (discussing experts' opinions).
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discretion to limit the manner in which experts may disclose this
information.292 Such evidence would not automatically be admissible
through expert testimony, and in fact, a stricter evidentiary rule would
provide additional authority for courts seeking to limit an expert's
testimony to prevent disclosure of a plaintiffs sexual history.
Finally, in most cases, a rule restricted to behavior between the
plaintiff and alleged harasser would adequately protect the defendant's
right to a fair trial; however, there may be situations in which it does
not. One way for the rule to ensure protection of the defendant would
be to include the same language that exists in the criminal rule. The
criminal rule permits courts to admit evidence when the exclusion of the
evidence would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.29
B. A Restrictive Discovery Rule
A more stringent evidentiary rule may better protect the privacy
rights of plaintiffs whose cases go to trial. However, it may afford only
an incremental benefit to the vast majority of plaintiffs whose claims
settle before trial.294 One of the significant limitations to Rule 412's
effectiveness is that it does not encompass discovery. To truly achieve
Rule 412's goals of protecting a plaintiffs privacy and protecting her
from the embarrassment that is associated with public disclosure of
intimate sexual details, Congress295 could enact a rule designed to curtail
discovery in sexual harassment claims. California has enacted such a
rule. The California rule states:
In any civil action alleging conduct that constitutes sexual harassment,
sexual assault, or sexual battery, any party seeking discovery concern-
ing the plaintiff's sexual conduct with individuals other than the
292. For example, see Federal Rule of Evidence 611 which allows the court to control the mode and
order of interrogation.
293. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C). The problem with this suggestion is that if lower courts believe
that Mentor requires courts to admit evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history, then courts may find that
exclusion of this evidence violates the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. However, given the
language of the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 412 and Rule 412's legislative history, it
is clear Congress intended legislatively to overrule the dicta in Mtilor concerning the relevance of a sexual
harassment plaintiff's sexual history. For a full discussion of this issue, see supra Part II.C.
294. Approximately 95% of all sexual harassment claims settle before trial. RobertJ. Alberts & Lome
Seidman, Seeking a "Safe Harbor," 20 S. ILL U. LJ. 223, 240 (1996).
295. Normally evidentiary and procedural rule changes go through the Rules Advisory Committee
before going to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then changes and forwards the revised rule to
Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). However, because the Court may believe that restrictive discovery
rules, like amended Rule 412, potentially abridge defendants' substantive rights, they may decline to enact
such rules. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text (discussing Rules Enabling Act issues arising with
Rule 412). Thus changes may have to be enacted directly by Congress.
RULE 412 LIAID BARE
alleged perpetrator is required to establish specific facts showing good
cause for that discovery, and that the matter sought to be discovered
is relevant to the subject matter of the action and reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This showing
shall be made by noticed motion and shall not be made or considered
by the court at an ex parte hearing. This motion shall be accompa-
nied by a declaration stating facts showing a good faith attempt at an
informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.296
California enacted section 2017(d), the discovery rtile, along with
evidentiary rules limiting the admissibility of evidence of a plaintiff's
sexual conduct.297 The legislative history underlying the California
statutes sounds much like the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412.
Like the drafters of Rule 412, the California legislature wanted to ensure
that sexual harassment victims were not discouraged from seeking a
legal remedy by fear of discovery of intimate details of their lives.298
California courts have used the discovery rule and California's
explicit constitutionally recognized right to privacy29 9 to bar discovery
of alleged childhood sexual abuse,3" plaintiffs' sexual relationships with
coworkers,3"' and other information about plaintiffs' sexual history.02
In many cases relying upon the discovery rule, the California courts
faced issues which have arisen in trial courts deciding discovery issues
under Rule 412. For example, in Knoettgen v. Superior Court,3 °3 an
employment discrimination action, the plaintiff's employer sought
discovery about the plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse. The defendant
argued that the information about childhood sexual abuse was impor-
tant because it may have "affected her [the plaintiff's] perception of
what transpired, her response thereto, and the nature and extent of
296. CAL EVID. CODE § 2017(d) (West 1996).
297. e e CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 783, 1106 (West 1997); CAL GOV'T CODE § 11440.40 (West 1998).
298. See CAL EVID. CODE § 783, Historical and Statutory Notes. This view parallels that stated by
the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 412:
The need to protect alleged victims against invasions of privacy, potential embarrassment,
and unwarranted sexual stereotyping, and the wish to encourage victims to come forward
when they have been sexually molested do not disappear because the context has shifted
from a criminal protection to a claim for damages or injunctive relief. There is strong social
policy in not only punishing those who engage in sexual misconduct, but in also providing
relief to the victim.
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
299. See CAL CONST. art. I, § I (recognizing that the right to privacy extends to a person's sexual
conduct); see alsogenera!sy Fults v. Superior Ct., 152 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App. 1979); Morales v. Superior
Ct., 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1979).
300. See Knoettgen v. Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1990).
301. See Mendez v. Superior Ct., 753 Cal. Rptr. 731, 744 (Ct. App. 1988).
302. See id. at 739-40; see also Vinson v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987).
303. 273 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
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emotional distress she may have suffered."3 ' The defendant further
asserted that the plaintiff waived any claim to privacy about this issue
when she filed suit. Finally, it produced a declaration from a forensic
psychiatrist which stated that inquiry into childhood sexual assaults was
important to a meaningful evaluation of a plaintiffs emotional distress
damages and to her perception of the defendant's conduct." 5
The court found that the affidavit did not rise to the level of "good
cause" anticipated by the statute. It reasoned that if the defendant's
justification constituted good cause, "then this type of discovery is
automatically available in every case, and section 2017(d) [the discovery
rule] is meaningless."30 6 It noted that the discovery the employer
demanded was exactly the "offensive, harassing, intimidating, unneces-
sary, unjustifiable and deplorable" conduct that the legislature intended
to prevent.0 7 The court concluded that a "case based on the conduct
of a plaintiff's coworkers should not be turned into an investigation of
plaintiff's childhood."3 The court denied the defendant's discovery
motion, stating that, "when an employee seeks vindication of legal
rights, the courts must not be party to the unnecessary infliction of
further humiliation.
30 9
In another case, a California court denied a discovery request because
of the defendant's failure to produce an expert affidavit. In Mendez v.
Superior Court,31° the plaintiff alleged a coworker accosted her, locked her
in a room, and forced her to orally copulate him on four occasions, with
each assault culminating in threats to the plaintiff or her family if she
divulged the assaults.31' The plaintiff eventually reported the assaults to
her employer and no action was taken against her alleged assailant. She
then filed suit against her employer alleging intentional and negligent
assault and battery and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress." 2
In her deposition, the plaintiff denied having any extramarital affairs;
however, other deponents indicated that the plaintiff had had extramari-
tal affairs, at least one of her alleged lovers being a coworker. The
defendant sought discovery of plaintiffs sexual history with others at her
workplace on the grounds that the possible connection between
304. Id.
305. See id.
306. I
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id
310. 253 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Ct. App. 1988).
311. Seeid. at 732-33.
312. Se id. at 733.
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plaintiff's arguably unstable marriage, her own infidelity, and her
alleged emotional distress was significant." 3 The defendant argued that
if the plaintiff was engaging in sexual activities with men other than her
husband, those sexual activities could be relevant as to whether the
defendant's conduct was the sole cause of plaintiff's emotional distress
or just one of many causes." ' Defendants also argued that their
causation argument established the specific facts and relevance to allow
discovery.
The court disagreed, finding that the defendant had failed to provide
an affidavit from a mental health professional that plaintiff's infidelities
led to emotional distress, or that there was any preexisting emotional
distress."' The court found that the request was "based solely on the
speculative presumption that infidelity may lead to emotional distress;
nowhere [did the] defendants [demonstrate] any factual support for this
presumption. '  It also rejected the defendant's "apportionment"
argument on the ground that the case involved emotional distress
distinctly related to:
[C]onduct separate and apart from the turmoil created by life in
general. Were we to accept defendants' proposition, arguably a
defendant might pry not only into the sexual affairs of the plaintiff and
her spouse but into her financial affairs, her health, the health of her
spouse, children, parents and siblings. Problems in any of these areas
might have caused preexisting emotional upset. 317
The court observed that the legislature clearly envisioned inquiry into
the sexual privacy of a plaintiff "only under circumstances or facts of an
extraordinary nature."3"8 It defined extraordinary as "going far beyond
the ordinary degree, measure, limit, etc.; very unusual; exceptional;
remarkable."3"9 It noted that, because an essential aspect of damage in
any sexual harassment case is the "outrage, shock and humiliation of the
individual abused, all cases will involve emotional distress."32 The
court held that to justify inquiry into the plaintiff's private sexual life,
either the plaintiff must claim some special damage, or the defendant
313. Se id. at 739.
314. &eid
315. See id
316. Id. at 739.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 740.
319. Id (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcTIONARY 497 (2d ed. 1982)).
320. Id.
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must demonstrate some extraordinary circumstance attendant to the
plaintiffs claim 2 '
As interpreted by the California courts, good cause is not an easy
standard to meet. In Knoettgen, the court found that an expert affidavit
asserting that childhood sexual abuse was relevant to the plaintiff's
claimed damages, and perhaps was relevant to her perception of the
defendant's conduct, did not rise to the level of good cause contem-
plated by the statute. In Mendez, the court found that the failure to
provide an expert affidavit to support the claim that plaintiffs infidelity
was a cause of her emotional distress indicated the defendant did not
have good cause for discovery of this information. The court's reason-
ing in both cases makes sense; if an expert affidavit was all that was
needed to show good cause, then the discovery rule would be meaning-
less. Likewise, to allow discovery of the plaintiffs sexual history based
upon the argument that it may result in the defendant finding another
cause for the plaintiffs emotional distress damages renders the rule
meaningless.3
22
As these cases illustrate, the California rule has been strictly inter-
preted. In part, this is due to the California courts' reliance upon the
specific California constitutional guarantee of a right to privacy. 23 This
raises a potential problem with a federal discovery provision modeled on
the California statute. There is an ongoing debate as to whether there
is a constitutional right to privacy. 24 Without an explicit constitutional
privacy right, would a federal rule be interpreted as strictly as the
California rule?
321. See it at 741. The court also addressed the issue of the necessity of discovery in order to show
witness bias. See id It would not sanction the wholesale questioning of numerous people about the most
intimate aspects of their lives without showing that these people might appear as witnesses. See id But it
left open the possibility of this line of impeachment if the witness appeared at trial, as long as the defendant
complied with the procedural requirements. See , Finally, addressing the impeachment issue based upon
plaintiff's deposition testimony, the court found that the defendants already had impeaching witnesses and
thus needed no further discovery. See id at 744.
322. See also Vinson v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987). In Vimson, the court permitted the
defendants to obtain a mental examination of the plaintiff. See id at 300. However, it forbade the examiner
to question the plaintiffabout her sexual history. See id at 300. The court noted that the legislative history
of the statute, which stated that "absent extraordinary circumstances" inquiry into sexual history should
not be permitted, suggests that a "stronger showing of good cause must be made to justify inquiry into this
topic than is needed for a general examination." Id at 300 n.8. It found that a defendant in a sexual
harassment case, desiring to ask questions relating to a plaintiff's sexual relations must show specific facts
justifying that particular inquiry. See id at 300.
323. See id. (noting that to overcome the constitutional right, even when the information is directly
relevant, there must be a careful balancing of the compelling public need for discovery against the
fundamental right of privacy).
324. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). The majority finds a right to
privacy in the "penumubra" ofthe constitution. See id The dissent takes issue with finding unenumerated
constitutional rights. See i at 529-30 (StewartJ., dissenting).
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Some may argue that a special federal discovery provision is
unnecessary. The discovery rules already have a provision that should
protect a plaintiff from unjustified or unduly intrusive discov-
ery-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).325 Even before the
enactment of Evidence Rule 412, Rule 26(c) was used to limit discovery
of sensitive and personal information in sexual harassment cases.326
Some may contend that the combination of Rule 412 and Rule 26(c)'s
protective order provisions should adequately protect plaintiffs from
unduly intrusive discovery if the rules are properly applied, without
enacting a special discovery rule.
Another potential argument against a special discovery rule is that it
selects one particular subset of cases--sexual misconduct cases-and for
these cases, changes the underlying principles of discovery. No longer
is discovery available to help parties find the true facts and narrow the
issues. Instead, it is used as a way to shield the plaintiff from having to
disclose potentially relevant information from a defendant and thus
hamper the defendant's ability to mount a legitimate defense.
These arguments are not as persuasive as they appear at first glance.
First, Congress may decide that plaintiffs in workplace sexual harass-
ment cases should have more protection than other plaintiffs. To force
women to expose intimate personal details of their lives in order to take
advantage of a legal remedy makes the remedy come at so great a cost
that many victims may choose not to pursue it.2" Thus, as a matter of
policy, Congress may choose to shift the normal balance of discovery in
workplace sexual harassment cases.
Furthermore, a rule such as the California one does not close the door
to discovery. Because of the highly sensitive and personal nature of
discovery requests and the potential for abuse, the California rule
requires the defendant to show good cause before allowing exploration
of the plaintiffs personal life.328
What constitutes "good cause?" One California court noted that to
justify inquiry into a plaintiffs private sexual life, either the plaintiff must
claim some special damages or the defendant must demonstrate some
extraordinary circumstances. 29 Special damages include claims for
325. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for a protective order
to protect a party or person from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."
FED. R. Civ. PRO. 26(c). Under Rule 26, a party may ask the court to limit both the method and amount
of discovery.
326. Se, e.g., Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D.
481 (D. Utah 1987).
327. See Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,51 (D.D.C. 1997).
328. See supra text accompanying note 296.
329. See Mendez v. Superior Ct., 253 Cal. Rptr. 731, 741 (Ct. App. 1988).
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more than ordinary emotional distress; for example, claims that the
plaintiff was hospitalized, suffered a diagnosable psychiatric disorder
caused by the harassment, or suffered some other extraordinary
damage. Of course, the irony is that the more injured the plaintiff, the
more her entire life is exposed. However, if the rule is clear, then
plaintiffs may choose, from the outset, whether to claim the extraordi-
nary damages, and will know that if they do, they may open the door to
inquiry into their private lives.
The same court defined "extraordinary circumstances" as "going far
beyond the ordinary degree, measure, limit; ... very unusual; excep-
tional; remarkable.""3 The term extraordinary circumstances, just like
the term good cause, is a matter each judge decides based on the case
before the court. For example, if the defendant had a good faith reason
to believe the plaintiff had a pattern of filing sexual harassment suits to
extort money, or if there was some evidence the plaintiff routinely used
sex in exchange for advancement and then "cried foul" when this tactic
did not work, that would constitute an extraordinary circumstance
justifying the plaintiffs sexual relationships with past employers.
Even if discovery were limited, some might argue that the proposed
discovery rule may be meaningless because it applies only to sexual
misconduct or sexual harassment claims. However, these claims usually
are not brought alone, but instead, generally are brought in conjunction
with claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,33 '
or other civil state law claims. 32  Even if discovery of a plaintiffs
personal life or sexual history may not be permissible with respect to the
federal sexual harassment claim, it still may be discoverable with respect
to the other claims. 3 However, if the rule was in place, plaintiffs could
make a tactical decision when filing their claims to file only a Title VII
claim, thereby limiting the discovery of sexual history evidence.
330. Id. at 573.
331. See Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987) (plaintiff brought Title VII and an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1343 (10th
Cir. 1990); Huffman v. City of Prairie Village, 980 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Kan. 1997); Hartsell v. Duplex
Prod., Inc., 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997).
332. SeeJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997) (Title VII and the equivalent
state law claim under Minnesota Human Rights Act); Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,
48 (D.D.C. 1997) (Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act).
333. For example, injone v. C/inton, the defense lawyers justified their requests for Ms.Jones' sexual
history because of her defitmation claim. See Paula Jones Allowed To Narrow Suit Defamation Claim Dropped by
Judge, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1997, at A7 (noting that PaulaJones's amending her complaint to drop her
defamation claim was a "move widely viewed as an attempt to prevent an examination of her personal
history"); see also Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987) (permitting discovery of all
workplace sexual conduct, including that unknown to the harasser, on the grounds that the conduct was
relevant to the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
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Defendants may also argue that a restrictive discovery rule potentially
deprives them of the ability to present a defense to which they are
entitled under Title VII law. They may contend that they are entitled
to discover information about the plaintiffs sexual history or predisposi-
tion to prove that the plaintiff welcomed the conduct or that she was not
offended by it. 'However, assuming that the evidence the defendant
seeks does not fit within the good cause or extraordinary circumstances
exceptions, it is most likely evidence whose probative value relies upon
the application of a sexual stereotypical view." 4 Because the law should
not indulge the use of sexual stereotypes in presenting defenses, defen-
dants' argument about their liability defense being hampered by this
discovery rule should not prevail.
Defendants may also contend that they are entitled to discover
whether a woman's past is the sole cause of her emotional distress
damages. For example, in McCleland v. Montgomery Ward,3"5 the plaintiffs
originally claimed that the emotional distress resulting from their
workplace harassment resulted in hospitalization for depression and
other emotional problems. During discovery, the defendants found that
the plaintiffs never mentioned the workplace harassment to their mental
health care workers or physicians. Instead, the plaintiffs told the doctors
that the cause of their emotional distress was childhood sexual abuse.
A rule barring a defendant from discovering information such as
this--information which goes to the crux of the defendant's causation
and damages defense-may deprive a defendant of his due process
rights. 36 Although this argument has some merit, as a practical matter,
it seldom will be applicable because in situations such as the one in
McCleland, the plaintiffs usually are seeking extraordinary damages.33 7
Thus the information would be discoverable even under the proposed
discovery rule. 8
Finally, opponents of a discovery rule may contend that there is a
difference between disclosures during discovery and disclosures at a
334. See su/n-a Part ILI.C (discussing commonly applied sexual stereotypes in sexual harassment claims).
335. No. 95-C-23, 1995 WL 571324 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1995).
336. Once discovered, courts may limit use of the evidence at trial. For example, in McCklang rather
than allow the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiffs about their childhood sexual abuse, the court could
have ordered the defendant to ask the plaintiffs if they told their health care workers the damages were
caused by something other than the defendant's conduct, without asking about the specific cause of the
plaintiff's damages.
337. The plaintiffs originally sought compensation for their hospitalizations; thus, their medical
records were discoverable. &eMcClmand, 1995 WL 571324, at *2.
338. Without the claim for extraordinary damages, the only reason the plaintifPs childhood sexual
abuse might be relevant is if the defendants sought to prove that a pre-existing mental condition was the
cause of any emotional distress the plaintiffs experienced. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 211-
14 and accompanying text.
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public trial. Unlike public trials, much can be done to shield discovery
from outside eyes. For example, all documents may be sealed and the
attorneys, parties and witnesses may be instructed not to disclose this
information." 9 Likewise, at least in some instances, being cross-
examined in a public courtroom about one's sex life is much worse than
having to answer questions on the same topic in the more informal and
somewhat more relaxed forum of a deposition. However, for some
plaintiffs, the act of disclosure, to anyone, in any situation, is truly
traumatic. In those situations, no protective order can cure the harm.
Furthermore, if the evidence is unlikely to be admissible, allowing
discovery only serves to embarrass the plaintiff and discourage her from
pursuing her legal remedies. 
3 40
C. Other Procedural Protections
Even if a rule limiting discovery of the plaintiff's sexual history and
predisposition were enacted, it would not completely eliminate the
invasion of the plaintiff's privacy interests that often occurs during
discovery. Perhaps even more intrusive than deposition or interrogatory
questions about a woman's sexual life are requests for her psychological
records, questions about her psychological history, and requests for
psychological exams under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In order to protect a sexual harassment plaintiff from
"undue invasions of her privacy" the manner in which some courts
handle requests for Rule 35 examinations and requests for the plaintiff's
psychological records also must be reformed.
Defendants seeking to discover whether their conduct caused the
plaintiff's alleged emotional distress often request the plaintiff's previous
therapy records as well as a Rule 35 psychological examination. Exactly
where courts draw the line on discovery of a plaintiff's therapy records,
or a request that the plaintiff submit to a Rule 35 psychiatric examina-
tion, varies widely. Some courts have found that a mere allegation of
emotional distress damages is sufficient to satisfy the good cause
requirement for a Rule 35 mental examination and is enough to permit
discovery of the plaintiff's psychological records.3 4' While other courts,
holding that an allegation of ordinary mental distress does not place a
339. See eg., Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.M. 1996) (instructing attorney not to disclose
to the client the plaintiff's sexual history information obtained during discovery).
340. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177
F.R.D. 48, 51 (D.D.C. 1997).
341. See Shepherd v. American Broad. Co., 151 F.R.D. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1993); Lowe v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, 101 F.R.D. 296, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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plaintiff's mental condition in controversy, have not allowed defendants
to invoke Rule 35 and to have access to the plaintiff's psychological
records,342 others have only permitted Rule 35 examinations when the
plaintiff alleges ongoing emotional distress 43 or intends to introduce
expert testimony at trial on her emotional distress,34 or when the
plaintiff alleges a specific psychiatric disorder 4 5 or raises issues for which
expert psychiatric examination and testimony may be necessary.3 46
Those courts limiting Rule 35 examinations rely on the policies
underlying Title VII to support their decisions. These courts express a
reluctance to allow defendants to employ discovery techniques that will
discourage plaintiffs from pursuing their right to be free from sexual
harassment. As one court noted, if a court were to require every sexual
harassment victim claiming emotional distress to submit to a Rule 35
psychological examination, plaintiffs would face further denigration to
secure their statutory right to be free from sexual denigration. 7
However, there is no clear standard for when a court will allow a
defendant to subject a plaintiff to a Rule 35 psychological examination.
Likewise, a clear directive does not exist regarding the discovery of a
plaintiff's psychiatric history and therapy records.
InJaffee v. Redmond,s  in which the plaintiff sought discovery of a civil
defendant's mental health records, the United States Supreme Court
recognized a federal therapist-patient privilege. The Court noted that
there is a strong societal interest in "facilitating the provision of
342. Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Cody v. Marriott
Corp. 103 F.R.D. 421 (D. Mass. 1984).
343. See O'Quinn v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 163 F.R.D. 226, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a
Rule 35 examination when plaintiff withdrew her claim that she suffered ongoing emotional distress);
Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying a Rule 35 examination
when there was no continuing emotional distress allegation); accord Curtis v. Express, Inc., 868 F. Supp.
467, 469 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). The rationale here is that a mental examination is not likely to be as useful in
ascertaining past pain and suffering as it is in assessing ongoing psychological problems. At least one
commentator disagrees with this reasoning, arguing that psychiatrists are capable of diagnosing past
conditions. See Richard A. Bales & Pricilla Ray, M.D., The Availability of RuLe 35 Mental Exaninations in
EmploymentDiscsimination Cases, 16 REv. LITIG. 1, 15-16 (1997).
344. Shepherd v. American Broad. Co., 151 F.R.D. 194 (D.D.C. 1993); Lowe v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 296 (1993).
345. See Bales & Ray, supra note 343, at 20 (discussing how some courts will not grant a Rule 35
mental examination absent an allegation that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer a specific
psychiatric disorder).
346. See id. at 12. Professor Bales and Dr. Ray argue that there are three issues on which a
psychiatrist may be needed to testify: (1) whether the plaintiff is suffering from or has suffered a diagnosable
psychiatric disorder; (2) the extent to which the symptomology or disorder is causally related to the
defendant; anrd (3) the severity of the damages (i.e., is the condition treatable, and if so, how and at what
cost.).
347. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1486.
348. 581 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996).
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appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or
emotional problem." '349 The Court concluded that without strong
protection of the sanctity and privacy of a therapist-patient relationship,
"confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients
would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the
circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably
result in litigation.
350
The recognition of a federal therapist-patient privilege was grounded,
in part, on the fact that virtually all states had some form of the privilege
and the states' promise of confidentiality "would have little value if the
patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a federal
court." 351 However, many states do not allow the plaintiff the protec-
tion of the privilege when she seeks emotional distress damages. 52 Like
the state courts, federal courts are divided on the effect an emotional
distress claim has on a plaintiffs psychotherapist-patient privilege. After
Jaffee, some courts have held that, by seeking emotional distress
damages, the plaintiff has put her mental or emotional state at issue and
has thus waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege.353 Others have
found that a plaintiff does not automatically waive the privilege when
she seeks damages for emotional distress.354 Thus, it is not clear how far
the protections set forth injaffee extend.
In sum, in sexual harassment claims, there is no clearly defined course
for courts to follow when looking at the application of the good cause
standard of Rule 35. Nor have the parameters of the federal therapist-
349. l. at 11.
350. Id. at 11-12.
351. Id. at 13.
352. In some states, the waiver of the privilege is automatic, while in others, the plaintiff must allege
more than "ordinary emotional distress" before the privilege is waived. See, e.g., Yoho v. Lindsley, 248 So.
2d 187, 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (patient who institutes claim for any physical or mental suffering does
not invite "automatic inquiry and intrusion into all past communications with psychiatrist"); LeVien v.
LaCorte, 640 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1996) (mere commencement ofaction in which
party's mental condition is placed in controversy is not enough to automatically permit implied waiver of
psychologist-patient privilege). Cf Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(physician-patient privilege is waived if the patient-litigant places his or her mental condition at issue as a
basis of a legal claim or affirmative defense); Sagmiller v. Carlsen, 219 N.W.2d 885, 897 (N.D. 1974)
(whenever a patient brings her mental condition into issue as an element of a claim or defense, the privilege
no longer applies); Wiggins v. Fairfax Park Ltd. Partnership, 470 S.E.2d 591, 596 (Va. Ct. App. 1996)
(medical reports of a civil plaintiffare not protected if the plaintiffs physical or mental condition is at issue).
353. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. CIV.A.97-593 & CIV.A.97-1161, 1997
WL 597905, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (emotional state at issue by claiming emotional distress
damages; therefore psychotherapist-patient privilege waived); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88 CV 1175, 1997
WL 151799, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (plaintiff waived privilege by placing mental and emotional
condition at issue and by intention to call a psychotherapist as an expert at trial); Sarko v. Penn-Del Dir'y
Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
354. &e Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997).
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patient privilege been delineated. Therefore, in addition to the
suggestions for a more restrictive evidentiary rule and discovery rule, 55
to protect fully a sexual harassment plaintiffs privacy, courts must
exercise caution when granting a request for a Rule 35 examination or
for a plaintiffs therapy records.
As one commentator has noted, one way to ensure a plaintiff's privacy
is protected while also protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial is to
limit Rule 35 examinations and accessibility to plaintiffs' psychiatric
records to those times when a plaintiff seeks extraordinary damages,
intends to introduce her own psychiatric experts, or when there are
other extraordinary circumstances which merit this extremely invasive
discovery.356 A mere claim for emotional distress damages should not
open the door to a plaintiff's entire psychological history.
D. Continued Education About Gender Bias
Although the evidentiary and discovery rule changes discussed herein
may help to better protect a sexual harassment plaintiffs privacy, no
procedural rules will adequately protect plaintiffs unless judges and
lawyers educate themselves about sexual stereotypes and gender bias.
The first step in the educative process is recognition of the problem. As
Professor Martha Minow notes, "only by admitting our partiality can we
strive for impartiality." '57 To do this, she suggests that we must explore
our own stereotypes and our own attitudes toward people we treat
differently-we should apply "strict scrutiny to ourselves." '58  To
explore our stereotypes and attitudes, we must also be educated about
what stereotypical views are and how we unconsciously hold them.3 5
9
Thus, if Congress is committed to protecting sexual harassment plaintiffs
from "invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual
details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding pro-
cess," Congress should continue to fund initiatives that help the judiciary
355. See supra Part IV. A-B.
356. See Susan R. Klein, A Surey ofEvidnce and Discomvy Ruks in Civil Seual Harassment Suits With Special
Emphasis on Caly/irnia Law, 11 INDUS. REL L.J. 540, 569-70 (1989) (making similar suggestions).
357. Martha Minow,Justise Engendered, 101 HARV. L REV. 10, 75 (1987).
358. Id. at 79.
359. One way to start the educative process is through reviewing social science literature which
explains sexual and occupational stereotypes and the impact they have on decision making. See, e.g., Peter
Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Beneolent Seaim, 70 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 491 (1996); Richard L. Wiener et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassmen" The
Effects of Gende, Legal Standard, andAmbivaknt ism, 21 LAW& HUM. BEFIAV. 71, 73-90 (1997).
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to examine this issue and to educate itself instead of cutting funding for
the study of gender, racial, and ethnic fairness." °
A judge's awareness of his or her attitude, and the stereotypes and
biases underlying it, may cause a judge to examine more carefully the
requested discovery or evidence. Awareness of internal biases may
produce a different outcome, or at least a more conscious one. By
recognizing and articulating sexual stereotypes, 6 I judges not only raise
their own awareness and the awareness of other litigants and colleagues,
they also let the community know that their decisions are not based
upon improper considerations.6 2 Even without additional rules or
changes in the substantive law, further education about and awareness
of gender bias will help judges better apply existing Rule 412.33
V. CONCLUSION
For sexual harassment cases to be fairly administered and litigated, we
must develop evidentiary and discovery rules which affirmatively
attempt, at all stages of the litigation process, to uphold the dignity of the
litigants, reflect societal moral values, and neutralize sexual stereotyping.
If the process is to be viewed as fair, we must attempt to account for
different perspectives, social attitudes, and cultural stereotypes through-
out the process. Although Rule 412 is a good start in reforming the
judicial process in sexual harassment claims, its ability to protect a sex-
ual harassment plaintiff from "invasion of privacy, potential embarrass-
ment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of
intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact
finding process" has been limited. The Rule's failure is not unexpected
for a number of reasons. First, the procedural rule exists in the context
360. See Todd D. Peterson, SAhdyi the Impact of Race and Etmicid in the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 173, 186 (1996) (noting that the Senate Appropriations Committee eliminated funding for ongoing
work of bias task forces). Professor Peterson also noted that a few Senators called for an outright ban on
future funding for gender, race, and ethnic bias task forces. See iti at 186-188, citg 141 CONG. REC. §
14,691-92 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995).
361. e, e.g., Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 51-53 (D.D.C. 1997) (explaining the
fallacy of defendant's argument that plaintiffs' sexual relationships with coworkers were relevant to the
defendant's perception that physical overtures and crude sexual invitations were welcome).
362. "It is not enough for the courts to be just; they must also be perceived to be just." Peterson,
supra note 360, at 176.
363. For other solutions on eliminating gender bias in the courts, see Stern, supra note 222; Rizzolo,
supra note 220, at 288; NiNTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 221, at 975-77. Additionally, parties should
continue to raise gender bias issues at all levels of the trial and appellate court proceedings. See, e.g.,
Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Ct. App. 1995) (overturning trial court decision because of
judicial gender bias); see asoJenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1292 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997)
(NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund raised the gender bias issue in its amicus brief; however, because
the plaintiffs did not raise a claim of gender bias, the appellate court did not address it).
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of substantive law which encourages defendants to use evidence of a
plaintiffs sexual history and predisposition.364 Second, the Rule fails to
account for discovery, which is when most plaintiffs suffer exposure of
their sexual history and consensual sexual activities. Third, legal rules
have only limited effect as long as those applying the rules hold gender-
biased attitudes and apply sexually stereotypical views during the
decision-making process.
There are many ways plaintiffs' privacy could be better protected.
For example, Congress or the Supreme Court could revise the substan-
tive law of sexual harassment365 or Congress could enact additional
procedural rules, covering everything from discovery to Rule 35
examinations, and it explicitly could state that Rule 412 encompasses
incidences of childhood sexual abuse. These actions would further
constrain judicial discretion. However, constraints on discretion must
also be accompanied by educative efforts. Additional procedural rules
cannot completely fix the problem. Judges and lawyers must engage in
a concerted effort to identify our gender-biased attitudes and account for
those attitudes in the decision-making process. Until we do so, all
procedural rules will have only a limited effect on eliminating unwar-
ranted invasions into a workplace sexual harassment plaintiffs personal
life.
364. As long as unwelcomeness and subjective hostility remain part of a hostile work environment
claim, defendants must be allowed to present a defense which indicates that the conduct was welcome, or
that the plaintiff did not find the environment hostile. These elements invite courts to apply sexual
stereotypes and gender-biased views to evidence of plaintiffs sexual history and predisposition.
365. For suggestions on how this could be done, see Estrich, supra note 7 (suggesting eliminating the
welcomeness requirement and revising the objective standard); Radford, supra note 12 (suggesting shifting
the burden of proof on unwelcomeness); Vhay, supra note 17 (suggesting changes in the prima facie elements
of a sexual harassment claim); Bernstein, upra note 270 (suggesting changing the reasonable person
standard).
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